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Effects of hospital competition, mergers and hospital factors on quality of care 
and hospital costs 
Background: In early 2000, Taiwan encountered major health reforms including the 
merging of several regional hospitals. Hospitals in Taiwan have been under 
unprecedented pressure to seek ways to manage their costs and improve the quality of 
care. As such, the study aims to provide evidence on what factors are associated with 
quality of care and hospital costs. Also, as research has provided inconsistent results 
on the effects of hospital competition on quality of care, this study applies 
meta-analysis to examine the effects of hospital competition on quality. The study 
aims to build a foundation for further analyses on the factors that may influence 
quality of care and hospital costs.   
Methods: The study uses various databases to identify, analyze, and summarize 
literature on hospital competition associated with quality of care. A meta-analysis is 
performed to investigate the effect of hospital competition on quality of care based on 
the studies selected. Also, the study assesses the association between hospital levels, 
location, ownership, merged/non-merged and quality in terms of process measures by 
applying the generalized linear mixed model (GLMM) and using hospital level data 
between 2011 and 2014 from the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MOHW). Moreover, 
the study employs the General Linear Mixed Model (GLMM) to examine the 
relationship between hospital costs and hospital factors in terms of year, 
merged/non-merged, ownership, locations, hospital level, the number of acute beds, 
and occupancy rate of acute beds.  
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Results: The meta-analysis of the effect of hospital competition depicts that hospital 
competition insignificantly deteriorates quality of care. The results on the association 
between hospital factors and quality of care show that a hospital’s quality may be 
affected differently by the hospital’s type, ownership, merger, and location. 
Furthermore, the study examines the association between hospital costs and 
merged/non-merged hospitals, the number of competitors, hospital ownership, 
hospital levels, location, the number of acute beds, and year. The results indicate that 
the number of acute beds, the occupancy rate of acute beds, and year are significantly 
associated with hospital costs.   
Conclusions: The study identifies the potential factors that may contribute to the 
quality of care and hospital costs. Although there are other factors that may also 
influence quality of care and hospital costs, this study provides a foundation for 
further investigation and analyses on these associations. In view of the growing 
healthcare expenditures and the aging population in Taiwan, it is crucial for policy 
makers to consider implementing more effective policies to reduce medical waste and 
ensure good health outcomes concurrently.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Background 
Since the implementation of global budget programs in 2002, hospitals in Taiwan 
have been under unprecedented pressure to seek ways to manage their costs and 
improve the quality of care. Competition among providers has thus become fierce 
since all providers want to maximize their share in the common budget by increasing 
their service volumes (Cheng, 2015). In an attempt to improve the competitiveness, 
decrease costs, and increase market share of the regional hospitals, the government 
merged ten local regional hospitals into a single large entity. Consequently, the 
merged hospital became the largest healthcare organization in Northern Taiwan, 
serving the medical needs of a population of approximately 2.6 million people in 
Taipei. However, during the process of the merger, there were some difficulties and 
problems mainly due to the resistance to these changes from the employees (Udn 
News, 2005). As a result, the merged entity suffered from a shortage of care providers 
that led to a deterioration of the quality of care (Lin, 2006), and some of the merged 
hospitals were later closed. Each merged hospital functions as a branch of the 
organization as a whole.  
According to the literature on hospital mergers (Dranove and Lindrooth, 2003; 
Dranove and Shanley, 1995; Guerin-Calvert and Maki, 2014; Romano and Balan, 
2010), they can lead to a reduction of costs due to the elimination of duplication in 
services and equipment, and thus can improve quality of care. Moreover, hospital 
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mergers are often associated with anticompetitive practices since they can lessen 
competition (U.S. Department of Justice, 2015). In fact, some hospital mergers have 
created regional monopolies or multi-hospital conglomerates. These lead to 
post-merger price increases due to reduced competition in the market and enhanced 
market power of the combined hospital (Capps et al., 2004; Makary, 2015). 
Competition has been used to enhance productivity in health care in countries such as 
Australia, Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, and the U.K., (Bloom et al., 
2010). However, healthcare programs such as Taiwan’s National Health Insurance 
(NHI), the U.K.’s National Health service (NHS), and U.S.’ Medicare regulate the 
prices, so hospitals compete with each other based on quality (Chen and Cheng, 2010; 
Bevan and Skellern, 2011). Although various studies apply multiple outcome 
measures to examine the effect of hospital mergers on hospital costs or quality of care, 
based on the author’s research, the number of studies that use identical outcome 
measures is scarce. However, various studies on hospital competition associated with 
quality of care utilize identical outcome measures such as death rates. Because there is 
no existing systematic review and meta-analysis on hospital competition associated 
with quality of care, this study aims to perform a pilot systematic review and 
meta-analysis to ascertain the extent that hospital competition is associated with 
quality of care. Furthermore, while there are many factors that affect hospital costs 
and the quality of care, research on the association of hospitals characteristics (such as 
ownership, levels, and locations) and hospital costs or quality of care is sparse in 
Taiwan. 
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The thesis examines three main aspects: 1) A systematic review of the effect of 
hospital competition on quality of care. 2) The effects of hospital merger, ownership, 
levels, location on hospital operating costs. 3) The effects of hospital merger, 
ownership, levels, location on quality of care. In Chapter 3, the systematic review 
includes various empirical studies on the effect of hospital competition on quality of 
care. Chapter 4 examines the effects of hospital ownership, levels, location, and 
merger on quality of care using seven quality measures. Chapter 5 examines the 
effects of hospital merger, ownership, the number of acute beds, occupancy rate, 
location, the number of competitors, and time on hospital costs. Both Chapter 4 and 5 
utilize the data of 106 hospitals located in northern, central, and southern Taiwan 
between 2011 and 2014 in Chapter 4 and 2012 and 2014 in Chapter 5 from MOHW. 
The results of each study are presented at the end of each chapter. 
 
Research Objectives and Study Aims 
Literature reviews are often discussed in the beginning of a research article; 
however, such literature reviews may not include a comprehensive synthesis of all 
relevant studies. According to the author’s research, there is no systematic review and 
meta-analysis on hospital competition associated with quality of care. This may be 
due to the variety of outcome measures that each study uses. The literature review by 
Bevan and Skellern (2011) and Gaynor (2003, 2006) seems to be the only reviews on 
hospital competition associated with quality of care. While Bevan and Skellern (2011) 
only synthesize findings of studies in the U.K., Gaynor (2003, 2006) reviews studies 
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from both the U.S. and U.K. There are various studies on hospital competition 
associated with quality of care and many of them utilize identical outcome measures 
such as 30-day AMI mortality rates. Hence Chapter 3 of this study intends to add to 
the existing research on the effects of hospital competition associated with quality of 
care by performing the pilot meta-analysis to synthesize, analyze, and summarize the 
empirical findings of more recent studies (i.e. after the year 2000) on hospital 
competition associated with quality of care. By doing so, this study aims to provide 
more recent results on the effect of hospital competition on quality. These results can 
then be used to develop new perspectives and to identify possible directions for future 
research. 
Chapter 4 aims to contribute to the research on the effects of hospital mergers, 
ownership, levels, and location on quality of care in Taiwan. The findings of the study 
provide objective and valuable information that may help policy makers to develop 
effective strategies that will create better policies to improve efficiency and quality of 
care for local hospitals. The main goal of this study is also to provide a foundation for 
further analyses on quality of care with a broader set of quality measures and 
diagnoses. 
Although the NHI has implemented various measures to contain costs in recent 
years, the long-term sustainability of the NHI is questionable as Taiwan is now facing 
a growing aging population and decreasing family sizes (Liu and Shen, 2015). As 
such, finding out the potential factors that may influence hospital costs and derive 
policy attention to address the issues driving up hospital costs may contribute to the 
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long-term survival of the program. Moreover, while there is abundant research about 
price effect, cost reduction, and quality of care associated with hospital mergers in the 
United States, empirical research on the effects of hospital merger, ownership, the 
number of acute beds, occupancy rate, the number of competitors, location, and time 
on quality of care in Taiwan is sparse. Thus, this study aims: 1) To identify the factors 
that may affect hospital costs; 2) To add to the existing limited literature on the 
association of hospital factors with hospital costs.  
Hypotheses/Research questions 
Chapter 3 intends to find out the following: 
i. What are the findings from the literature on the association of hospital 
competition and quality of care? 
ii. What is the result from meta-analysis?  
iii. Is there heterogeneity? What are the sources of heterogeneity? 
iv. What new directions for future studies are derived from the study? 
In Chapter 4, the study examines whether the quality of care is associated with 
hospital merger, ownership, levels, and location, using seven quality indicators such 
as AMI patients’ rate of returning to emergency department (ED) of the same hospital 
due to the same or similar disease within 3 days after discharge, the rate for 
outpatients revisiting the same hospital the same day after being treated for the same 
disease, the rate of inpatients staying in acute beds for more than 30 days, the rate of 
returning to ED of the same hospital within 3 days after discharge, the rate of 
returning to ED within 1 day after discharge, the percentage of patients receiving 
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antibiotics treatment for more than 3 days after debridement, and the rate of patients 
staying in ED for more than 48 hours. Chapter 4 intends to answer the following key 
questions: 
1. What are the characteristics of the hospitals that achieve better quality of 
care?  
2. What are the new directions for future research?  
In Chapter 5, the study examines whether hospital operating costs are associated 
with hospital ownership, merger, the number of acute beds, occupancy rate, the 
number of competitors, location, and time. The main dependent variable is total 
hospital operating costs. Chapter 5 intends to answer the following key questions: 
I. What are the hospital factors that are associated with hospital costs?   
2. What are the directions for further work?  
 
The hypotheses and assumptions of Chapter 4 are as follows:  
- Hospital merger, ownership, levels, and location are associated with quality of 
care. 
- The number of acute bed size and quality is positively associated. 
- The number of competitors and quality is positively associated. 
 
The hypotheses and assumptions of 5 are as follows 
- Hospital merger, ownership, the number of acute beds, occupancy rate, the 
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number of competitors, location, and time are associated with quality of care. 
- The number of competitors and hospital costs are negatively associated. 





CHAPTER 2: EXPANDED DISCUSSION OF METHODS 
Chapter 2 illustrates the conceptual framework that constructs the foundation of 
this research on the effects of hospital factors associated with costs and quality of care. 
The definitions of the variables used are also described in this chapter.   
 
Conceptual Framework 
Theoretically, hospital mergers can achieve efficiency, cost reduction, and 
improved quality of care as a result of improved access to care and technology, 
reduced administrative and overhead costs, elimination of redundant services, and 
realignment of services of larger scale operations (Ibid). In the U.S., studies on 
hospital mergers have become prevalent since recommendations for merging hospitals 
began in the 1960’s (Angrisani and Goldman, 1997). Various studies have 
investigated the effects of hospital mergers associated with costs, prices, and quality 
of care. Empirical evidence on mergers associated with quality and costs provides 
mixed results as depicted in the literature review section in Chapter 4 and 5. 
According to Connor et al. (1997), only certain levels of hospital mergers lead to cost 
reduction, and the merger groups which have been studied have varied (Connor et al., 
1997). Moreover, differences in the methodologies and approaches of the studies as 
well as the locations and market conditions of the mergers may result in different 
merger effects (Guerin-Calvert and Maki, 2014). However, it is evident that when 
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hospitals’ prices are fixed such as in Taiwan, then hospitals compete based on quality 
of care (Chen and Cheng, 2010; Chang et al., 2004). Although there can be a positive 
correlation between the quality of care and the size of a hospital (Dranove, 1998), 
mergers can result in increased administrative complexity which results in less 
efficient hospitals and poorer patient outcomes (Town, 2011). However, as shown in 
the literature review section, there are no definite conclusions with regards to the 
evidence of hospital mergers on the quality of care. A variety of studies demonstrate 
that a high volume of health services is associated with better patient outcomes. Since 
the merged hospitals consolidate their services, they could produce larger volumes of 
health services with smaller range of health services, resulting in better patient 
outcomes (Capps, 2005). Quality of care can be improved through the merging of 
hospitals when one of higher quality of care is merged with one of lower quality of 
care as the hospital with the higher quality of care is then able to show the other 
hospital how to improve (Ibid). If the merged entity achieves economies of scale and 
better management, it should achieve cost savings and better patient outcomes than 
non-merged hospitals.  
 While literature depicts that hospital merger is one of the factors that can 
affect hospital costs and quality of care, research also demonstrates that there are 
other factors that can influence hospital costs and quality of care. Besides hospital 
merger, there are other contributing factors that have impact on hospital costs and 
quality of care such as hospital size, occupancy rate, lengths of stay, aging population, 
hospital ownership, level, location, technology, and the number of competitors. 
However, based on the author’s research, empirical evidence on the effects of these 
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factors on hospital costs and quality of care in Taiwan is not as abundant as in the U.S. 
Moreover, structural contingency theory indicates that both organizational and 
environment factors are main determinants for institutional performance (Jiang et al., 
2006; Donaldson, 2001). In fact, research demonstrates that factors such as patient 
related factors (i.e. type of disease and socio-demographic factors), hospital related 
factors (i.e. physician motivation, physician competency), and market factors (i.e. 
healthcare system, resources) can affect hospital costs and quality of care (Hung and 
Chang, 2008; Mosadeghrad, 2014). Furthermore, empirical findings of various studies 
indicate that factors such as the number of competitors, hospital ownership, level, 
location, technology or aging population is significantly associated with hospital costs 
and quality of care (Eggleston et al., 2008; Chang et al., 2004; Chang, 2011; Hsieh 
and Cheng, 2011; Hung and Chang, 2008; Lin et al., 2003). However, the results of 
existing literature on the effects of these factors associated with hospital costs and 
quality of care are mixed. This may be due to the differences in quality measures, 
methodology and countries. Due to the availability of data, this study focuses on 
certain hospital related factors. Figure 2.1 illustrates the conceptual framework.    
 
Data Source 
PubMed and Google Search are the main databases used for the systematic 
review and meta-analysis in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, the main source 
of data is from the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MOHW).  
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Description of variables 
All variables used in this research are described below: 
 
Number of acute beds  
The number of acute beds is an annual average number compiled by MOHW. It is 
used as a measurement of hospital scale or size (Shepard et al., 2000). 
 
Occupancy rate 
It is an annual average rate for the acute beds occupied in each hospital. The rate is 
provided by each hospital which then reports this rate to MOHW periodically. 
 
Total operating costs 
Total operating costs are those that related to the core business of the hospitals 
(Connor et al., 1997). They include drug costs, medical equipment costs, depreciation, 
rental fees, research and development fees, medical social service costs, 
administration and personnel costs, and other medical services expenses. Since 2014, 
hospitals are required to disclose their financial statements. These financial statements 
are published in MOHW’s website (http://www.nhi.gov.tw) which is open to the 
public. So far the website contains the financial statements of most hospitals from 
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fiscal year of 2012 until 2014 but it does not have the financial statements of all 
hospitals in Taiwan.  
 
Number of hospitals 
The number of beds reflects the intensity of competition in the market (Wong et al., 
2005). It is the annual average number of hospitals in the same marketplace. The 
marketplace is defined by an area code. Hospitals with the same area code are 
considered to be located in the same marketplace. The number of hospitals is 
compiled by MOHW which annually publishes such data in its website. 
 
Merged hospitals 
The merged hospitals include Taipei City Hospital, New Taipei City Hospital, and 
Kaohsiung City Hospital. For Taipei City Hospital, ten regional hospitals were 
merged into one. For New Taipei City Hospital, two regional hospitals were merged 
into one. For Kaohsiung City Hospital, three regional hospitals were merged into one. 
The level of all the merged hospitals is regional hospital based on the accreditation 
result in Taiwan. In this study, the three merged regional hospitals are horizontal 
mergers in which the merged hospitals are located in their original geographic 
markets, operate in separate facilities, and are owned by each city government. It is 
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also a consolidation of a multi-hospital system except that the merged city hospitals 
report unified financial reports.  
 
Hospital ownership 
Ownership is either private owned or public owned in this study. Public owned 
hospitals are those owned by the government. Private owned hospitals include those 
that are owned by charitable foundations and local corporates. 
 
Hospital levels 
In Taiwan, all hospitals are accredited by the Taiwan Joint Commission on Hospital 
Accreditation which classifies hospitals into three levels in accordance with their 
quality of care, number of beds, medical teaching and clinical capabilities (Wu et al., 
2013). There are three hospital levels based on accreditation: medical centers, regional 
hospitals, and district hospitals. The information on hospital level is from MOHW 
website.    
 
Hospital location 
This study includes the three locations in Taiwan: northern, central Taiwan, and 
southern Taiwan. Northern Taiwan includes Taipei City, New Taipei City, Keelung 
City, and Yilan City. Central Taiwan includes Taichung City, Chunghwa City, and 
Nantou City. Southern Taiwan includes Kaohsiung City and Pintung City. 




In Chapter 5, time is an independent variable. The time period of data in Chapter 5 is 
from 2012 to 2014. 
 
Quality indicators monitored by the NHI (NHI, 2016) and obtained from 
MOHW website (used in Chapter 4 only): 
The emergency department visit rate for Acute Myocardial Infarction patients 
who return to the hospital within 3 days after discharge (Abbreviation: AMI) 
If AMI patients revisit the emergency services after discharge from the hospital within 
3 days, it may signal that the hospital’s care for AMI patients is ineffective as such 
instances can be avoided with adequate medical care and health education. This rate is 
the annual average rate. 
 
The rate for outpatients revisiting the same hospital the same day after being 
treated for the same disease (Revisit) 
The reasons that patients returning to the hospital after being treated the same day 
may be due to patients’ seeking second opinion from a different doctor in the same 
hospital, inadequate medical treatment received in the previous visit, or insufficient 
medical education. Nevertheless, hospitals that have rates higher than others may 
reflect poor quality of care. This rate is the annual average rate.   
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The percentage of inpatients admitted to acute beds for more than 30 days 
(Acute) 
If a hospital has a higher percentage of patients staying in acute beds for more than 30 
days than other hospitals, then this signals that that hospital may be inefficient in 
managing inpatient beds and providing acute care. This rate is the annual average rate. 
  
The percentage of patients staying in the emergency room for more than 48 
hours before being admitted (ER48) 
The rate shows how efficient a hospital’s emergency room is in treating patients with 
acute illness or serious injuries. If a hospital has a higher rate than other hospitals, 
then its hospital’s care for patients in the emergency room may be less productive than 
others. This rate is the annual average rate. 
  
The percentage of patients receiving antibiotics treatment for over 3 days after 
debridement (Antibio) 
According to the NHI, the process of debridement requires absolute sterility or 
sanitation and the use of antibiotics is for prevention (2016). Thus, a treatment period 
of 3 days is sufficient. However, if a hospital has a percentage higher than the average, 
the hospital shall investigate the reasons for such a statistic. This rate is the annual 
average rate. 
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The rate of emergency department visits for patients who return to the hospital 
within 3 days of discharge (ER3) 
Patients who return to the hospital through the emergency room within 3 days of 
discharge may be due to various reasons such as unstable conditions and poor medical 
compliance. However, when a hospital has a higher rate than other hospitals, this may 
signal that the hospital needs to improve the quality of inpatient care. This rate is the 
annual average rate. 
 
The percentage of patients being treated in the same emergency room returning 
to the emergency room the same day after (ER1) 
According to the NHI, patients should not be discharged from hospitals if any of the 
following conditions exists:  
1. Life signs are unstable. 
2. Complications are not under control. 
3. Injuries are seriously infected, including bleeding or swelling 
that cannon be treated through outpatient services. 
4. Patients (except patients receiving kidney dialysis) have 
difficulty urinating.  
5. Treatments through intravenous injections need to be 
continued and cannot be removed right away. 
6. Patients transferring to another hospital due to non-medical 
reasons. 
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7. Patients requiring inpatient treatments.  
 
This indicates the adequacy of the care in a hospital’s emergency department. A 
higher percentage could mean that the emergency department needs to improve its 
efficiency and quality of care. This rate is the annual average rate. Table 2.1 depicts 
definitions of variables and sources of data. 
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Table 2.1 Variable Definitions and Data Source 
Variables Type Coding Data 
Source 
Merged dichotomous 0 (non-merged hospitals)  
1 (merged hospitals) 
MOHW 
website 
Hospital ownership dichotomous 0 (private) 
1 (public) 
 
Hospital level categorical 1 (medical centers) 
2 (regional hospitals) 
3 (district hospitals) 
 
Hospital location categorical 11 (northern Taiwan) 
22 (southern Taiwan) 
33 (central Taiwan) 
 
The number of acute beds continuous 0 and above MOHW 
website 
The average occupancy 
rate of acute beds 
continuous 0 to 100% MOHW 
website 
Total hospital operating 
costs 
continuous 0 and above MOHW 
website 
The emergency 
department visit rate for 
Acute Myocardial 
Infarction (AMI) patients 
who return to the hospital 
within 3 days after 
discharge (AMI) 
continuous 0 to 100% MOHW 
website 
The rate for outpatients 
revisiting the same 
hospital the same day 
after being treated for the 
same disease (Revisit) 
continuous 0 to 100% MOHW 
website 
The percentage of 
patients admitted to acute 
beds for more than 30 
days (Acute) 
continuous 0 to 100% MOHW 
website 
The percentage of use of 
antibiotics for over 3 
days after debridement 
continuous 0 to 100% MOHW 
website 
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(Antibio3)   
The rate of emergency 
department visits for 
patients who return to the 
hospital within 3 days of 
discharge (ER3)  
continuous 0 to 100% MOHW 
website 
The percentage of 
patients staying in the ER 
for more than 48 hours 
before being admitted 
(ER48) 
continuous 0 to 100% MOHW 
website 
The percentage of 
patients being treated in 
the emergency room 
returning to the 
emergency room the 
same day after being 
treated (ER1) 
continuous 0 to 100% MOHW 
website 
Outcomes of Interest 
Pooled effect of hospital 
competition on quality of care 
Linear Beneficial (coefficient < 0)  
Harmful (coefficient > 0)  
Association is significant if P < 
0.05, insignificant if P > 0.05. 
Association of hospital 
mergers, hospital ownership, 
hospital levels, hospital 
location on quality of care  
Linear Beneficial (coefficient < 0)  
Harmful (coefficient > 0)  
Association is significant if P < 
0.05, insignificant if P > 0.05. 
Association of hospital 
mergers, hospital ownership, 
hospital levels, hospital 
location, the number of acute 
beds, and average occupancy 
rate of acute beds on total 
operating costs  
Linear  Beneficial (coefficient < 0)  
Harmful (coefficient > 0)  
Association is significant if P < 





Figure 2.1 Conceptual framework linking hospital factors with hospital costs and 
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CHAPTER 3:  
SYSTEMATIC REVIEW AND META-ANALYSIS ON THE 




Background and Purposes: Various empirical studies use a range of data, quality 
measures and methodologies to examine the association between hospital competition 
and quality of care. However, the results are still inconclusive which may be due to 
the differences in methodologies, locations, time periods, patient groups, and quality 
measures (Chen and Cheng, 2010). Therefore, this study applies meta-analysis to the 
results of the studies in the Western countries addressing the same research question 
with an aim to derive a conclusion regarding the effect of hospital competition on 
quality of care and to build a foundation for further analysis on studies using different 
quality measures. 
Methods: This study is a systematic review and uses meta-analysis to combine results 
from various studies to obtain an overall outcome. Measure of effect size, I
2
 test, 
meta-regression to find sources of heterogeneity, tests for publication bias, sensitivity 
analysis and cumulative analysis are performed. The mean effect size is estimated by 
coefficient and standard error with P values less than 0.05 which is considered 
statistically significant. 
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Results: Based on the selection criteria, only 11 studies are included for this 
meta-analysis. The pooled effect of hospital competition on quality of care is reported 
by all of the 11 studies that are included in the analysis. The results of the 
meta-analysis suggest that hospital competition reduces quality of care, but the overall 
effect is relatively insignificant from a statistical perspective (Point estimate = 0.008, 
95% CI = -0.004 ~ 0.020, P > 0.05) (Figure 3.1).  
Conclusion: Based on the findings from this study, hospital competition slightly 
increases AMI mortality rates, although such negative impact is statistically 
insignificant. However, such negative impact can be expected to lessen over time as 
medical technology, practices, and techniques continue to improve. Indeed, this 






Introduction and Background 
Economic theory suggests that competition leads to better quality in 
price-regulated markets where price is set above marginal cost. Firms would compete 
based on non-price dimensions such as quality, and would enhance quality to increase 
market share until profits are equal to zero (Ganor et al., 2010). However, when firms 
set the prices, the impact of competition on quality depicts mixed results (Gaynor, 
2006). Indeed, various countries, such as the UK and Taiwan, adopt a fixed price 
regime that causes hospitals to compete based on quality. As a result, hospitals in such 
markets need to improve quality of care to attract patients. Various empirical studies 
use a range of data, quality measures and methodologies to examine the association 
between hospital competition and quality of care. However, the results are still 
inconclusive which may be due to the differences in methodologies, locations, time 
periods, patient groups, and quality measures (Chen and Cheng, 2010; Mutter et al., 
2008). As meta-analysis statistically synthesizes the results from multiple related 
studies and systematically examines the underlying effect, it provides a logical 
framework that can reduce bias and improve the precision in estimating these 
reactions (Borenstein et al., 2009; Fragkos et al., 2014; Pan, 2013; Warrier et al., 
2015). Therefore, this study applies meta-analysis to the results of the studies in the 
Western countries addressing the same research question. Based on the author’s 
research, this study is the first meta-analysis on the association of hospital 
competition with quality of care. Therefore, this study aims to derive a conclusion 
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regarding the effect of hospital competition on quality of care and to build a 
foundation for further analysis on studies using different quality measures. 
Tests for heterogeneity, meta-regression to investigate sources of heterogeneity, 
tests for publication bias, sensitivity analysis, and cumulative analysis have been 
performed. The findings are presented in the results section. This chapter is organized 
as follows: literature review, methods, selection criteria, evaluation of effect, 
evaluation of heterogeneity and sources, evaluation of publication bias, sensitivity 
analysis, and cumulative analysis, results, discussion, and conclusion. 
 
Literature review on impact of hospital competition on quality of care  
Mixed Results 
Mutter et al. (2008) apply negative binomial regression to examine the effect of 
hospital competition on inpatient quality of care. They utilize 12 hospital competition 
measures, 38 quality measures and Medicare inpatient discharge data of 2,595 
hospitals in 22 states from the 1997 Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) 
State Inpatient Databases. Mutter et al. (2008) find that there is no correlation 
between measures of competition and those of quality. However, while the researchers 
suggest that hospital competition does not directly impact quality of care, they 
indicate that hospital competition may impact quality in different areas. Similar to the 
findings of Romano and Mutter (2004), Mutter et al. (2008) also reveal that hospitals 
that perform well in some quality dimensions could also perform weakly in others. 
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Moreover, Mutter et al. (2008) suggest that hospital competition seems to enhance 
quality of care in the dimensions that are related to physician skill, expertise, and 
areas that are comprehensible to patients. In contrast, quality is reduced in those 
associated with hospital infrastructure, nursing mix, and hospital staff where the 
dimensions of quality are less obvious to patients. Mutter at al. (2008) indicate that 
because physicians are linked to flows of patients, hospitals in a more competitive 
market want to attract patients by providing the best physicians. Therefore, they are 
likely to allocate resources to improve quality in areas such as physician skill and 
expertise as they are more visible to patients. Furthermore, Mutter et al. (2008) point 
out that in order to manage costs effectively, hospitals may allocate resources to 
improve quality in one area at the expense of another where the quality of care is less 
visible to patients, such as infrastructure and support staff. 
Similar to the findings of Mutter et al. (2008), a UK-based study by Proper et al. 
(2008) finds mixed evidence of the effects of hospital competition on quality of care. 
Proper et al. (2008) utilize administrative data of 145 acute hospitals in the English 
NHS from 1991 to 1999 and the DID approach to examine the impact of hospital 
competition on quality of care. The researchers state that competition varies over time 
due to policy changes and thus use such changes to analyze the impact of competition 
in the specified period (Proper et al., 2008). Moreover, Proper et al. (2008) state that 
because competition does not exist in some areas due to geography, the way they are 
able to distinguish these hospitals from those located in competitive places is by using 
the number of hospitals located in each catchment area as a competition measure. 
Proper et al. (2008) indicate that competition reduces less observed measures such as 
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the 30-day AMI mortality rates, while improving well published measures such as 
waiting lists for treatment. Proper et al. (2008) illustrate that the 30-day AMI 
mortality rates are higher while the average waiting times and number of persons on 
waiting list are lower in competitive areas. Similar to Mutter et al. (2008), Proper et al. 
(2008) also suggest that hospitals in competitive areas tend to focus on improving 
measures visible to patients at the expense of the unmeasured activities that are poorly 
observed by the patients.  
 In an Australia-based study by Palangkaraya and Yong (2013) mixed effects have 
also been found. The researchers conclude that competition increases mortality but 
reduces unplanned readmission, although the negative effect of competition on 
mortality is weak statistically. Palangkaraya and Yong (2013) examine the effect of 
hospital competition on quality using logistical models and hospital administrative 
data of patients with heart diseases from 2000 to 2005 from Victoria State in Australia. 
They use 30-day mortality rates and 30-day unplanned readmission rates as quality 
indicators in conjunction with HHI and the number of competing hospitals as the 
competition measures. Palangkaraya and Yong (2013) indicate that while the adverse 
effect of competition on mortality is relatively the same for both private and public 
hospitals, the positive effect of competition on unplanned admission is much higher 
for public hospitals than that of private ones. Palagkaraya and Yong (2013) explain 
that this may be because that unplanned admissions being one quality dimension that 
patients could not easily observe, as illustrated by Mutter et al. (2008). 
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 Furthermore, a Dutch study conducted by Bijlsma et al. (2010) finds mixed 
evidence of the association of hospital competition and quality of care. However, 
instead of using only outcome measures to empirically examine the effect of hospital 
competition on quality, Bijlsma et al. (2010) also apply process measures, as they 
view that hospitals have more control over processes of care which are less likely to 
be affected by patients’ health conditions. They use hospital data from 2004 to 2008 
and 18 quality indicators including both process and outcome indicators to assess the 
relation between hospital competition and quality. To measure hospital competition, 
Bijlsma et al. (2010) use mainly three measures: number of competitors in the hospital 
catchment area, number of competitors adjusted for population, and the distance to the 
nearest competitor. Bijlsma et al. (2010) find a statistically significant effect of 
hospital competition on process indicators, but an insignificant effect on outcome 
measures. Thus, Bijlsma et al. (2010) suggest that competition induces hospitals to 
improve production efficiency. Moreover, Bijlsma et al. (2010) indicate that 
competition causes hospitals to improve certain quality indicators that are visible to 
patients as a signal of quality. Furthermore, Bijlsma et al. (2010) find that quality 
improves as outcome measures such as decubitus, AMI, and reoperations depict more 
positive results over time. This suggests that increasing policy focus on quality related 
issues helps improve the quality of care in hospitals.       
 




 Kessler and McClellan (2000) examine the effects of hospital competition on 
quality of care for non-rural Medicare beneficiaries with AMI using Medicare claims 
data in 1985, 1988, 1991, and 1994. They use risk-adjusted 1-year AMI mortality 
rates as a primary outcome measure. Instead of using the conventional HHI, which is 
based on actual patient flows to measure hospital competitiveness, Kessler and 
McClellan (2000) measure competition with predicated HHI. This is based on 
predicted patient choice that is determined by each patient’s distance from a hospital 
in relation to their zip code. Kessler and McClellan (2000) find that AMI patients 
have higher one-year mortality rates in less competitive areas. Kessler and McClellan 
(2000) indicate that before 1991, AMI patients in the least competitive areas have 
higher rates of mortality and lower treatment costs than those of patients in most 
competitive areas. However, as of 1991, treatment of AMI patients in the 
least-competitive areas has become significantly higher than that of the patients in 
competitive areas. Also, the mortality rates for the AMI patients in least competitive 
area are significantly (1.46 percentage points) higher than those of the AMI patients in 
competitive areas (Kessler and McClellan, 2000).   
 Extending the study done by Kessler and McClellan (2000), Kessler and Geppert 
(2005) investigate the impact of hospital competition on quality of care for all 
non-rural elderly who suffer AMI, and are enrolled in traditional fee-for-service 
Medicare between 1985 and 1996. Kessler and Geppert (2005) use the Medicare 
claims data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Service for patient 
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demographic information, and they use data from the American Hospital Association 
for hospital characteristics so they are able to define patients as high-risk or low-risk 
based on their health outcomes and expenses. The researchers estimate 
competitiveness based on the same HHI model used by Kessler and McClellan (2000) 
as discussed above. Kessler and Geppert (2005) find that patients in the least 
competitive markets have higher 1-year mortality rates than the rates of patients in the 
most competitive markets. Moreover, Kessler and Geppert (2005) indicate that while 
low-risk patients in competitive markets obtain less intensive treatment than they do 
in uncompetitive markets, their health outcomes are similar. However, high-risk 
patients in competitive markets obtain more intense treatment than they do in 
uncompetitive markets, yet they result in significantly better health outcomes (Kessler 
and Geppert, 2005). Kessler and Geppert (2005) conclude that competition results in 
better health outcomes and lower expenditures, and thus improves social welfare. In 
addition, their results are consistent with the findings of Kessler and McClellan (2000) 
who conclude that a higher level of bed capacity per patient results in higher mortality 
rates, larger expenditures, and lower cardiac complication rates.         
 In the U.K. where the English National Health Service (NHS) reforms from 2002 
to 2008 encouraged hospitals to compete on non-price services and allow patients to 
choose hospitals for care (Cooper et al., 2011), a study by Cooper et al. (2011) applies 
a DID approach to examine the impact of whether such reforms result in better 
hospital quality. Cooper et al. (2011) use patient-level data of Hospital Episodes 
Statistics (HES) from 2002 to 2008 and 30-day AMI mortality rates as quality 
measures. In addition to logged hospital numbers, Cooper et al. (2011) estimate 
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competition mainly with HHI based on actual patient flows and HHI based on 
predicated patient flows, which is similar to the one used in the study of Kessler and 
McClellan (2000) mentioned above. Cooper et al. (2011) find that hospital 
competition enhances quality of care as the 30-day mortality rates reduce faster in 
more competitive fixed-priced markets after the introduction of patient choice in 2006. 
Moreover, Cooper et al. (2011) indicate that the improvements in both the annual 
number of AMI treated and the mortality rates from 2002 to 2006 are a result of the 
growing use of new technology in AMI treatment as well as enhancements in public 
health. In conclusion, Cooper et al. (2011) estimate that the reforms lead to 
approximately 300 fewer deaths per year.    
 Similarly, Gaynor et al. (2010) investigate how the policy changes in the UK’s 
NHS in 2006 led to increased hospital competition. They also investigate how this 
affects clinical quality by using a DID approach and referring it to hospital 
administrative data of 162 acute hospitals for financial year 2003 and 2007. They use 
four sets of mortality rates such as 28-day AMI inpatient mortality rates, 30-day AMI 
(on or after discharge) mortality rates, 28-day all-cause inpatient mortality rates, and 
28-day all-cause excluding AMI inpatient mortality rate quality measures. HHI based 
on patient flows to each hospital is used as a measure of market structure. Gaynor et 
al., (2010) find a significant relationship between market concentration and clinical 
quality and hospitals in competitive markets have substantially lower mortality rates 
than those located in less competitive markets after the reform. As such, Gaynor et al., 
(2010) conclude that increased competition leads to better patient outcomes and 
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hospitals in more competitive markets are more efficient in managing resources to 
enhance patient outcomes.   
More evidence that competition leads to better quality is shown in a UK based 
study by Bloom et al. (2010) that also finds competition improves quality of care. 
Bloom et al. (2010) examine the impact of competition on hospital management 
quality and hospital performance in English public hospitals using data mainly from 
the UK Department of Health for 2005-2006 and hospital surveys on hospital 
management practices conducted in 2006. Bloom et al. (2010) use the number of 
public hospitals within a certain geographical area as a competition measure and 
28-day AMI mortality rates as a measure of quality. Bloom et al. (2010) conclude that 
higher competition improves both clinical and management quality as AMI mortality 




In the U.S., policy reforms such as the Health Care Reform Act (HCRA) in New 
Jersey in 1992 have raised concerns about the effect of the new HCRA on quality of 
care as the reform in New Jersey not only allowed price competition among hospitals, 
but also substantially reduced subsidies in medical care for the uninsured (Volpp et al., 
2003). Volpp et al., (2003) investigate the impact of price competition on the quality 
of care for uninsured AMI patients, using the DID approach and hospital discharge 
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data in New Jersey and New York to compare the changes in AMI outcomes from the 
period before the reform (from 1990 to 1992) to that after the reform (from 1994 to 
1996). The researchers choose New York where there is no change in hospital price 
regulation during that period for comparison purposes. Volpp et al., (2003) use the 
30-day AMI mortality rate as the study’s primary outcome measure, and they find that 
the AMI mortality rate for the uninsured in New Jersey raised 3.7 to 5.2 percentage 
points in comparison to that of New York from the pre-reform period to the 
post-reform period. In conclusion, Volpp et al., (2003) indicate that price competition 
and reduced subsidies as a result of the market-based reform, decrease the quality of 
care for the uninsured AMI patients in New Jersey. 
Another U.S. based study also finds negative impact. Using a technique in 
measuring competition similar to that of Kessler and McClellan (2000), 
Gowrisankaran and Town (2003) measure the impact hospital competition has on the 
mortality rates for five different payer groups of patients with AMI or pneumonia in 
Los Angeles County, California between 1989 and 1993. Gowrisankaran and Town 
(2003) utilize hospital morality rates for pneumonia and AMI as measures of hospital 
quality and HHI based on predicated patient choice as competition measures for all 
different payer groups of patients. In contrast to the finding of Kessler and McClellan 
(2000), whose results demonstrate that hospital competition enhances quality of care 
for Medicare patients, Gowrisankaran and Town (2003) find that competition among 
hospitals reduces hospital quality for Medicare patients while it improves quality for 
HMO patients. Although Gowrisankaran and Town (2003) suggest that such result 
may be due to the small Medicare margins or hospitals’ deviations from 
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profit-maximizing behavior. However, Gaynor (2006) indicates that during this period, 
there was a great increase in the entry of hospitals specializing only in heart disease 
treatment, thus the margin must be substantial to explain such an entry. Furthermore, 
Gaynor (2006) hypothesizes that such differences in findings could be due to the 
differences in the instrumentation approaches that the researchers employ. 
 Similarly, a U.K. based study done by Propper et al. (2004) finds that hospital 
competition reduces quality of care. Following the National Health Service (NHS) 
reforms in the 1990s that lead to payer-driven competition among hospitals, Propper 
et al. (2004) utilize hospital level data between the financial years of 1995/6 and 
1997/8 to examine the impact of hospital competition on quality of care. The 
researchers use 30-day AMI inpatient morality rates as primary quality indicators. To 
measure competition, Propper et al. (2004) apply two measures of competition based 
on potential patient travel: the first measure of competition is the number of 
competitors in each hospital’s catchment area and the second measure of competition 
is the share of each hospital’s catchment population that can go to the other 20 
hospitals within the same service area. Propper et al. (2004) conclude that hospital 
competition does not enhance quality of care as hospitals in more competitive areas 
result in higher mortality rates. However, Propper et al. (2004) indicate that as their 
study is the first to examine the impact of hospital competition on quality in the U.K., 
they recommend further confirmation by other studies with patient level data or 
longer time series data.  
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 The above studies provide some evidence on the association of hospital 
competition with quality of care. However, their findings vary. This may be due to a 
number of reasons such as differences in methodology, sample size, patient groups, 
and locations. Therefore, the study uses meta-analysis to investigate the underlying 
impact of hospital competition, using summary data of the studies identified in the 
literature search.     
 
METHODS 
Study identification  
This study is a systematic review and uses meta-analysis to combine results from 
various studies to obtain an overall outcome. For the preliminary research, 
computer-assisted research is conducted through PubMed, using keywords such as 
hospital competition or quality or hospital competition and quality or competition and 
quality of care. Boolean operators (NOT, AND, and OR) are also used in the search 
process (McGrath et al., 2012; Pan, L.M., 2013). Google search is also used to 
identify unpublished studies. Moreover, unpublished research unavailable on a 
particular website is obtained by directly contacting the relevant organization such as 
U.S Department of Justice. Furthermore, the references lists in the retrieved research 
reports are examined and then a computerized search through the databases was 
conducted to obtain relevant papers not found in the initial search. The titles and 
abstracts of the studies generated from the preliminary research are examined to 
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determine their relevance. The majority of the studies are published in journals, while 
some of them are unpublished studies, working, or discussion papers from 
professional associations such as CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy 
Analysis, Centre for Economic Performance (CEP) in London School of Economics 
and Political Science, the Centre for Market and Public Organization (CMPO) in 
Bristol Institute of Public Affairs, and National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER). The second stage review includes analyzing research questions and aims, 
data, methodology, and results of the studies identified in the preliminary search to 
determine suitability.  
 
Selection criteria  
The studies selected from the search are based on a variety of criteria. First, the 
research includes published and unpublished studies written in English. Second, 
studies are excluded if their topics are unrelated to hospital competition associated 
with quality of care. Third, studies which are descriptive, do not use multivariate 
analysis to control for confounding factors, or do not provide sufficient information 
such as methodology and data are excluded. Fourth, types of competition other than 
hospital competition are excluded. Fifth, because the 30-day AMI mortality rate is the 
mostly commonly used quality measure, this meta-analysis employs this indicator to 
measure the quality of care and thus studies that do not use this quality measure are 
excluded. As the meta-analysis aims to provide updated observations based on recent 
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studies, studies conducted before the year 2000 are excluded. In addition, data and 
information from all studies selected are independently reviewed and extracted.   
 
Evaluation of effect  
 Comprehensive Meta-Analysis version 2.0 is used to conduct meta-analysis 
(Borenstein et al., 2009). Measure of effect size, I
2
 test, meta-regression to find 
sources of heterogeneity, tests for publication bias, sensitivity analysis and cumulative 
analysis are performed. The mean effect size is estimated by coefficient and standard 
error with P values less than 0.05 which is considered statistically significant. A 
negative coefficient indicates that hospital competition results in a reduction in 30-day 
AMI inpatient mortality rates, suggesting competition leads to better quality of care, 
and vice versa. To test for heterogeneity, both the fixed effect and random effects 
models are used. While the fixed effect model assumes that the real effect size is the 
same for all studies, the random effects model assumes that the real effect size differs 
across studies (Borenstein, 2009). According to Borenstein (2009), selection of the 
fixed effect model should be based on two conditions: variables that can impact the 
outcome are identical across the studies and the goal of the meta-analysis is to obtain 
one common effect size for the population defined (Ibid). However, if the goal of the 
meta-analysis is to assess the mean effect in various studies, the random effects model 
should be used (Ibid). Furthermore, as there is heterogeneity among the studies, the 
random effects model is employed to assess the pooled effect.  
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Evaluation of heterogeneity and sources 
Heterogeneity is the variation in outcomes between studies (StatsDirect, 2016). 
Heterogeneity is measured by Cochran’s Q-statistics and the I
2
 test. Cochran’s 
Q-statistics is calculated as the weighted sum of squared differences between each 
study’s effect estimate and the overall effect estimate (Huedo-Medina et al., 2006; 
StatsDirect, 2016). It provides a p-value of 0.05 as a cut-off for significance; however, 
Cochran’s Q-statistics has low power at detecting heterogeneity (Higgins et al., 2003). 
Thus this study also applies I
2
 statistic to test for heterogeneity. The I
2
 statistic 
estimates the percentage of total variation across studies that is due to heterogeneity 
rather than chance (Flecher, 2007; Higgins et al., 2003; MedCalc, 2016). A result of 
0% from the I
2 
test depicts non-existence of heterogeneity while a result of 100% 
indicates the highest level of heterogeneity (Li et al., 2016). As shown in the result 
section, the I
2
 test is above 50% which suggests that the total observed variation is a 
result of heterogeneity (Li et al., 2016; Warrier et al., 2015). The potential sources of 
heterogeneity or moderators in CMA 2.0, were assessed by meta-regression analysis. 
The meta-regression method applies regression analysis to investigate the impact of 
selected variables on the effect size (Haidich, 2010). Age of patients, sample size of 
hospitals, study year, and year of publication are identified as potential sources of 
heterogeneity. As study period length varies from study to study, the median year is 
used for each study in the meta-regression. If the mean age is provided, it is used in 
the meta-regression. Otherwise, the median age is applied.  
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Evaluation of publication bias, Sensitivity analysis, cumulative analysis  
To examine publication bias in the meta-analysis, a funnel plot, the Rosenthal 
fail-safe N method, Begg and Mazumdar Rank Correlation Test and Egger’s 
regression test are used. Publication bias arises when research with significant results 
are likely to be published (Gordis, 2009). If there is publication bias in the sample of 
studies included in the meta-analysis, the validity of the results from the meta-analysis 
is threatened (Rothstein et al., 2005). The funnel plot which is used for detecting 
publication bias or heterogeneity, is a scatter plot of the effect estimate against a 
measure of study size (Azsures-Cabrera and Higgins, 2010). If publication bias is 
present, the funnel plot is expected to have an asymmetric shape (Haidich, 2010). 
Moreover, the Rosenthal fail-safe N method computes a combined p-value for all 
studies in the meta-analysis and then finds the number of additional unpublished 
studies with null results to make the results of a meta-analysis statistically 
insignificant (Borenstein, 2005; Cochrane Handbook, 2016). The Begg and 
Mazumdar Rank Correlation test computes the inverse correlation between study size 
and effect size to test for publication bias (Ibid). Similar to the Rosenthal fail-safe N 
method, this test reports two-sided p-value and if the p-value is significant (p-value < 
0.05), there is publication bias (Rothstein et al., 2005). Furthermore, Egger’s test uses 
a simple linear regression to predict y (the actual values of the effect size of each 
study divided by its standard error) by using their precision (the inverse of the 
standard error) to test that the intercept that captures the bias is significantly different 
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from zero (Thornton and Lee, 2000). If the p-value from this test is significant 
(p-value < 0.05), then there is publication bias. 
Sensitivity analysis tests the stability of the pooled effect estimate (Ressing et al., 
2009). It is performed by deleting each study one by one to examine if any studies 
have a significant effect on the pooled outcome (Warrier et al., 2015). Finally, the 
studies are sorted chronologically based on publication year, and a cumulative 
analysis is conducted to investigate how the estimated effect size may have changed 
over time (Borenstein et al., 2009). It depicts the stability or instability of the effect 
over time (Tanner-Smith, 2013).    
   
Results 
Included studies 
575 studies are located from databases and of these, 102 are identified for further 
screening as their titles or abstracts seem to meet the selection criteria. An additional 
10 papers are identified from the references. Based on the selection criteria, only 11 
studies are included for this meta-analysis. As one study (Gowrisankaran and Town, 
2003) uses two different populations to examine the identical effect and provides 
separate results for the two populations, the two results of this study are treated as two 
separate studies. As such, 11 studies are included in the meta-analysis. Table 3.1 
provides summary data of the studies that are selected in the analysis.     
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Association of hospital competition with quality of care  
Pooled effect 
The pooled effect of hospital competition on quality of care is reported by all of 
the 11 studies that are included in the analysis. This is illustrated in the forest plot 
(Figure 3.1). The results of the meta-analysis suggest that hospital competition 
reduces quality of care, but the overall effect is relatively insignificant from a 
statistical perspective (Point estimate = 0.008, 95% CI = -0.004 ~ 0.020, P > 0.05) 
(Figure 3.1). The forest plot in Figure 3.1 depicts the estimated point estimate and the 
95% confidence intervals for each study. It shows that the point estimates of the 
correlation coefficient range from -0.313 to 0.330 and the 95% confidence intervals 
include 0.  
 
Individual studies 
If the 95% confidence interval for the estimated difference among the groups 
does not include 0, then the effect is a statistically significant one (P < 0.05) (Lang 
and Secic, 2006). Among the eleven studies selected in this meta-analysis, the 
majority of the studies have 95% confidence intervals that do not include 0. There are 
eight studies that indicate a statistically significant association between hospital 
competition and quality of care (P<0.05) (Figure 3.1). Among these eight studies, four 
studies demonstrate that hospital competition lowers AMI mortality rates (i.e. Bloom 
et al., 2010, Cooper et al., 2011, Gaynor, 2010; Gowisankaren and Town, 2003 
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(HMO)), whereas the other four indicated the opposite effect (i.e. Gowisankaran and 
Town, 2003 (Medicare), Mutter et al., 2008, Propper et al., 2004, Propper et al., 
2008). 
  
Heterogeneity and meta-regression 
Moreover, the forest plot illustrates the presence of heterogeneity as there is a 
wide spread of results and many 95% confidence intervals do not overlap (Figure 3.1). 
To measure heterogeneity statistically, the I
2 
statistic is performed, which indicates a 
percentage of 81.50%, suggesting high heterogeneity (I
2 
= 81.50%) (Figure 3.1). As 
the studies vary and there is evidence of heterogeneity (Point estimate = 0.008, 95% 
CI = -0.004 ~ 0.020, P > 0.05), the random-effects model is used in this meta-analysis 
(Figure 3.1). Meta-regression is performed to investigate potential sources of 
heterogeneity such as year of publication, age, sample size, and study year and each 
source’s relationship with the outcome. The results of meta-regression indicate that 
after adjusting for the three potential sources of heterogeneity, only year of 
publication appears to be the crucial factor of heterogeneity (Slope = -0.00207, 
Intercept = 4.13648, P < 0.05) (Figure3.2), while age, study year, and sample size do 
not show significant results (Age: Slope = -0.00074, Intercept = 0.05428, P > 0.05; 
Study year: Slope = -0.00888, Intercept = 17.75239, P > 0.05; Sample size: Slope = 
0.00002, Intercept = -0.00079, P > 0.05) (Figure 3.3, 3.4, 3.5). The meta-regression 
results indicate that studies that are published more recently depict better quality of 
care (or lower AMI mortality rates) (Figure 3.2). Such result indeed reflects the 
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current situation in the healthcare market where medical technology has become more 
advanced compared to the past. Therefore, mortality rates are likely to be lower 
because of the improved quality of care resulted from the continuous advancement in 
medical practices, technology, and prevention techniques over time (Bijlsma et al., 
2010). In addition to improvement in medical technology and prevention techniques, 
policy reforms that help improve healthcare quality may have also improved hospital 
quality (Ibid).   
 
Sensitivity analysis 
The sensitivity analysis is conducted to determine if any study has impact on the 
pooled effect (Lang and Secic, 2006). The result of sensitivity analysis indicates that 
no particular study has significant impact on the pooled association of hospital 
competition and quality of care (Figure 3.6).  
 
Publication bias  
Publication bias is not presented as determined through visual inspection of the 
funnel plot, which is symmetrical (Figure3.7). Also, the Classic fail-safe N tests 
indicate that there is no significant publication bias (P > 0.05) (Table 3.2). The Begg 
and Mazumdar rank correlation test depictes insignificant results (Kendall’s tau = 
-0.09091, 1 tailed P > 0.05, 2-tailed P > 0.05). Moreover, the Egger’s regression 
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further confirms non-existence of publication bias (Intercept = 0.68047, 95% CI = 
-0.81279 ~ 2.30324, 1-tailed and 2 tailed P > 0.05).  
 
Cumulative meta-analysis 
 Cumulative meta-analysis is performed by sorting the studies chronologically 
based on year of publication from the earliest to the most recent to identify how the 
evidence on the effect of hospital competition on quality of care has shifted over time 
(Borehein et al., 2009). Figure 3.8 illustrates that the first study on HMO patients 
done by Gowrisankaran and Town (2003) depicts statistically significant evidence on 
the association of hospital competition and quality of care (P < 0.05). It is the first and 
the only study among the studies selected that suggests a positive effect of hospital 
competition on reducing mortality rates. After adding their study on Medicare patients, 
the point increases substantially and changes to the opposite direction, suggesting that 
hospital competition increases mortality rates. The studies that are conducted 
afterwards all demonstrate the opposite effect of hospital competition on mortality 
rates with statistically insignificant results (P > 0.05). However, the magnitude of the 
impact of hospital competition on mortality rates decreases over time. The precision 
of the estimated outcome improves since the 95% confidence intervals become 
narrower as the data accumulates (Lang and Secic, 206). Overall, the cumulative 
analysis demonstrates a stable result. Furthermore, the impact of hospital competition 
on mortality rates becomes less detrimental over time which may possibly be due to 
differences in methodologies between the studies included and the improvement in 
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medical technology which helps decrease mortality rates as illustrated in the section 
on heterogeneity and meta-regression.  
 
Discussion 
In this meta-analysis, the examination of the pooled effect of hospital 
competition on quality of care was based on the selected studies in the context of 
Western countries such as U.S., UK, Netherlands, and Australia. The results from the 
meta-analysis random-effects calculation suggest that hospital competition relatively 
increases AMI mortality rates, although this association is statistically insignificant (P 
> 0.05). The results from the meta-analysis indicate that among the eleven studies, 
there are only eight that depict a statistically significant association of hospital 
competition and quality of care. While half of the studies (one U.S. and three UK 
studies) depict that hospital competition leads to better quality (lower mortality rates), 
the other half (two UK and two U.S. studies) indicate the opposite. Due to the variety 
of contexts, the mixed results from the meta-analysis on the association between 
hospital competition and quality of care may be predictable. The results from the 
studies in markets where firms set prices have been predicted by the economic theory 
that competition in these markets leads to either improved or decreased quality 
(Gaynor, 2006). However, the results of studies done for regulated markets are not 
consistent with the economic theory for fixed-price markets. Gowrisankaran and 
Town’s study (2003) finds that hospital competition increases the 30-day AMI 
mortality rates for Medicare patients. Gowrisankaran and Town (2003) explain that 
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the negative impact of hospital competition on quality could be due to either the low 
margins of Medicare patients or hospitals’ deviation from profit-maximizing behavior. 
However, due to the complicated nature of the health care market, the economic 
theory on the association between competition and quality may not be applicable as it 
is not clearly evident in the healthcare sector (Glick et al., 2015).  
There are a number of reasons for the mixed results on the association between 
hospital competition and quality of care more distinctly. First, the variation in study 
methodology may have contributed to the inconsistent results on the association 
between hospital competition and quality of care (Bevan and Skellern, 2011; Glick et 
al., 2015). The studies employed various methods for measuring HHI based on the 
predicated flow of patients and the actual flow of patients, the number of hospitals, or 
the distance to the closest competitors as illustrated in the literature review section. 
However, these approaches may not have accurately captured the market size of a 
hospital. Hospital quality could be associated with market size and distance to another 
hospital, so there can be differences between urban and rural areas (Cooper et al., 
2011). Second, the nature of hospital business is too complicated to use one single 
quality measure to assess the overall quality of care of a hospital. As one single 
quality indicator may only relate to a particular condition, other aspects of quality in a 
hospital may be overlooked (Gaynor, 2006). As such, when sufficient data and 
research become available, future meta-analysis focusing on other quality and 
competition measures to estimate the pooled effect of hospital competition on hospital 
quality will be beneficial.     
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In consideration of the possible limitations of this study, it is important to 
recognize that because of the limited availability of studies employing identical 
quality measures, only eleven studies were examined. This can be seen to limit its 
representativeness. Future research to include more studies would help substantiate 
the results find in this study.  
 
Conclusion 
The differences in study design and methodology of studies on the association of 
hospital competition and quality of care may account for the inconsistent findings. 
Based on the findings from this study, hospital competition slightly increases AMI 
mortality rates, although such negative impact is statistically insignificant. However, 
such negative impact can be expected to lessen over time as medical technology, 
practices, and techniques continue to improve. Indeed, this downward trend is 
consistent to the findings in prior research (Bijlsma et al., 2010; Proper et al., 2003). 
Furthermore, in view of the complicated nature of the healthcare market, when 
assessing the effect of hospital competition on quality of care, different measures for 
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Figure 3.1 Forest Plots of the effect of hospital competition on quality of care 
 
Study name Subgroup within study Statistics for each study Point estimate and 95% CI
Point Standard Lower Upper 
estimate error Variance limit limit Z-Value p-Value
Gowrisankaran and Town, 2003 (HMO) HMO -0.230 0.100 0.010 -0.426 -0.034 -2.300 0.021
Gowrisankaran and Town, 2003 (Medicare) Blank 0.330 0.110 0.012 0.114 0.546 3.000 0.003
Propper et al., 2003 Blank 0.010 0.006 0.000 -0.002 0.022 1.574 0.116
Propper et al., 2004 Blank 0.120 0.040 0.002 0.042 0.198 3.000 0.003
Mutter et al., 2008 Blank 0.058 0.027 0.001 0.006 0.110 2.176 0.030
Propper et al., 2008 Blank 0.006 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.011 2.400 0.016
Bijlsma et al., 2010 Blank 0.018 0.085 0.007 -0.149 0.185 0.212 0.832
Bloom et al., 2010 Blank -0.150 0.065 0.004 -0.278 -0.022 -2.294 0.022
Gaynor, 2010 Blank -0.313 0.116 0.013 -0.540 -0.086 -2.698 0.007
Cooper et al., 2011 Blank -0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.000 -2.800 0.005
Palangkaraya and Yong, (2013) Blank 0.268 0.206 0.042 -0.134 0.671 1.306 0.192
0.008 0.006 0.000 -0.005 0.020 1.215 0.224
-0.25 -0.13 0.00 0.13 0.25
Quality improves Quality deteriorates


































Figure 3.6 Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Study name Subgroup within study Statistics with study removed Point estimate (95% CI) with study removed
Standard Lower Upper 
Point error Variance limit limit Z-Value p-Value
Gowrisankaran and Town, 2003 (HMO) HMO 0.008 0.006 0.000 -0.004 0.020 1.365 0.172
Gowrisankaran and Town, 2003 (Medicare) Blank 0.006 0.006 0.000 -0.005 0.018 1.077 0.282
Propper et al., 2003 Blank 0.007 0.008 0.000 -0.008 0.022 0.969 0.333
Propper et al., 2004 Blank 0.005 0.006 0.000 -0.007 0.016 0.829 0.407
Mutter et al., 2008 Blank 0.005 0.006 0.000 -0.007 0.017 0.810 0.418
Propper et al., 2008 Blank 0.014 0.014 0.000 -0.014 0.042 0.993 0.321
Bijlsma et al., 2010 (A20) Blank 0.008 0.006 0.000 -0.005 0.020 1.201 0.230
Bloom et al., 2010 Blank 0.009 0.006 0.000 -0.003 0.021 1.438 0.150
Gaynor, 2010 Blank 0.008 0.006 0.000 -0.004 0.020 1.368 0.171
Cooper et al., 2011 Blank 0.017 0.014 0.000 -0.012 0.045 1.158 0.247
Palangkaraya and Yong, (2013) Blank 0.007 0.006 0.000 -0.005 0.020 1.178 0.239
0.008 0.006 0.000 -0.005 0.020 1.215 0.224
-0.25 -0.13 0.00 0.13 0.25

































Figure 3.8 Cumulative analysis 
 
  
Study name Subgroup within study Cumulative statistics Cumulative point estimate (95% CI)
Standard Lower Upper 
Point error Variance limit limit Z-Value p-Value
Gowrisankaran and Town, 2003 (HMO) HMO -0.230 0.100 0.010 -0.426 -0.034 -2.300 0.021
Gowrisankaran and Town, 2003 (Medicare) Blank 0.048 0.280 0.078 -0.501 0.597 0.172 0.864
Propper et al., 2003 Blank 0.030 0.116 0.013 -0.197 0.257 0.258 0.796
Propper et al., 2004 Blank 0.053 0.064 0.004 -0.072 0.178 0.828 0.408
Mutter et al., 2008 Blank 0.053 0.039 0.002 -0.024 0.129 1.351 0.177
Propper et al., 2008 Blank 0.025 0.013 0.000 -0.000 0.050 1.922 0.055
Bijlsma et al., 2010 (A20) Blank 0.024 0.012 0.000 -0.000 0.049 1.936 0.053
Bloom et al., 2010 Blank 0.019 0.013 0.000 -0.007 0.045 1.465 0.143
Gaynor, 2010 Blank 0.015 0.014 0.000 -0.013 0.044 1.077 0.281
Cooper et al., 2011 Blank 0.007 0.006 0.000 -0.005 0.020 1.178 0.239
Palangkaraya and Yong, (2013) Blank 0.008 0.006 0.000 -0.005 0.020 1.215 0.224
0.008 0.006 0.000 -0.005 0.020 1.215 0.224
-0.25 -0.13 0.00 0.13 0.25






EFFECTS OF HOSPITAL MERGER, OWNERSHIP, LEVEL, AND 




Background: As there seems to be limited current research on quality of care in the 
context of Taiwan, this study aims to add to the limited research and to serve as a pilot 
study using the seven quality measures compiled by MOHW to examine the 
association of hospital merger, ownership, level, location and quality of care. As 
research indicates that hospital size and hospital competition affect quality of care 
(Brownlee and Saini, 2014; Whiet et al., 2014; Dash and Meredith, 2010), this study 
also investigates the association between hospital size, competition and quality of 
care.   
Methods: The study uses hospital level data between 2011 and 2014 from the 
Ministry of Health and Welfare. The study applies the generalized linear mixed model 
(GLMM) to investigate the association between hospital factors such as merger, 
ownership, level, location and quality in terms of the seven process measures 
provided by the Ministry of Health and Welfare.    
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Results: The study finds that hospital ownership, level, and location are significantly 
associated with quality in terms of the process measures (P < 0.05). However, the 
study finds insignificant and mixed relationship between hospital competition, merger 
and quality (P > 0.05). The study finds significant association between the number of 
acute beds and quality (P < 0.05). Larger hospitals depict weaker quality in terms of 
certain measures as shown in the results section. Furthermore, the evidence shows that 
public hospitals have poorer quality. 
Conclusion: The study finds hospital ownerships, levels, and locations are associated 
with quality in terms of certain process measures. However, the study finds 
insignificant and mixed relationships between hospital competition, mergers and 
quality. The study finds significant association between the number of acute beds and 
quality. Larger hospitals depict weaker quality in terms of certain measures shown in 
the results section. Furthermore, the evidence shows that public hospitals have poorer 
quality. Policy attention to improve hospital quality in public hospitals and to rectify 





Taiwan implemented the National Health Insurance program in 1995, and 
launched the global budget program with a fixed-budget polity in 2002. Since then, 
hospitals have experienced unprecedented pressure as the reimbursement payments 
from BNHI decrease while at the same time their costs increase each year (Medical 
Information Science Reference, 2015). To sustain their operations, hospitals have to 
retain costs while maintaining high quality of care. As a result, many hospitals have 
exited the market and the number of hospitals has reduced by 63% (Ministry of 
Health and Welfare, 2015). However, this reduction of hospitals is mainly in public 
hospitals (Huang et al., 2012). On the other hand, the number of private hospitals has 
increased by 2.3 times during the same period. Consequently, the total number of 
hospital beds has grown about 33% from 1995 to 2013 (Ministry of Health and 
Welfare, 2015). In addition to these two major medical reforms, the Taiwan 
government merged several regional hospitals in Northern and Southern Taiwan in 
2003, 2004, and 2005. Indeed, one of these mergers even created the largest public 
hospital in Northern Taiwan. However, based on the author’s research, the reform in 
merging the regional hospitals has not led to substantial growth in the research of 
hospital mergers or competition. In the U.S., while many studies investigate the 
effects of hospital mergers associated with costs and price, there are only a few 
studies that examine the effects of hospital mergers associated with quality of care. 
However, the findings of the studies in general demonstrate mixed and inconsistent 
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results on the association of hospital mergers and quality of care. The results of these 
studies are discussed in the literature review section.  
Moreover, while there are many factors that can contribute to the quality of care 
of hospitals, research on the association between hospitals factors (such as ownership, 
levels, technology, the number of competitors, occupancy rate, hospital scale, and 
locations) and quality of care is also very sparse in Taiwan. This may be due to the 
unavailability of hospital and patient data, and the limited access to it. In order to 
monitor and improve the quality of care in local hospitals, the Ministry of Health and 
Welfare has started compiling and publishing information on hospital quality in terms 
of the various process care measures as well as financial statements of local hospitals 
in recent years. As such, information on quality of care of hospitals in Taiwan can be 
visible to patients, and consequently hospitals may focus more on improving their 
quality of care.  
This chapter assesses the association between hospital ownership, 
merged/non-merged, level, location and quality of care using on hospital level data. 
Also, it investigates the differences in quality of care among the hospitals based on 
hospital size (measured by the number of acute beds) and competition (measured by 
the number of hospitals in the same marketplace). This study aims to add to the 
limited research pertaining to quality of care in the context of Taiwan. It is also a pilot 
study to assess the association between hospital merger, ownership, levels, locations 
and quality and care in Taiwan, using the seven quality measures published by 
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MOHW. Moreover, it aims to build a foundation for further analyses on quality of 
care with a broader set of quality measures.  
This chapter is organized as follows: The next two sections provide literature 
review on quality of care associated with hospital mergers and literature review on the 
relationship of hospital ownership, level, location and quality of care. The subsequent 
sections then present the methods, data, results, discussion, and conclusion.  
 
Literature review on quality of care associated with merger 
Ho and Hamilton (2000) apply Cox’s proportional hazard and linear probability 
models to examine the impact of hospital mergers and acquisitions on quality of 
inpatient care. The researchers use hospital data from the AHA Annual Survey of 
Hospitals from 1991 to 1995 and patient-level data from the California Office of 
Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD) discharge data between 1991 
and 1996. Ho and Hamilton (2000) use inpatient mortality, 90-day readmission rates, 
and early discharge of normal newborns within 48 hours as quality measures. Ho and 
Hamilton (2000) report that there is no negative effect of hospital mergers and 
acquisitions on inpatient mortality for heart attack or stroke patients; however, given 
the small sample size, the impact may be too small to be noticeable. In contrast, Ho 
and Hamilton (2000) find that hospital mergers increase the probability of 90-day 
readmission rates for heart attack patients by 1.7 percentage points, while acquisitions 
of independent hospitals increase the readmission rates by 0.9 percentage points, and 
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acquisitions of systems increase the rates by 0.7 percentage points. Ho and Hamilton 
(2000) indicate that acquisitions can negatively impact quality of care as the 
probability of readmission rates for heart attack patients increases in all three types of 
mergers. They also find that while mergers of independent hospitals in a competitive 
market decrease the probability of early discharge of newborns by 1.7 percentage 
points, acquisitions of a system hospital by another system raise the probability of 
early discharge of newborns by 3.7 percentage points (Ho and Hamilton, 2000). Ho 
and Hamilton (2000) conclude that hospitals in higher concentrated markets seem to 
result in lower quality after consolidation, as shown in the increase in early discharge 
for newborns in some hospital acquisitions. 
Cuellar and Gertler (2003) identify 1,377 hospitals from 1995 to 2000 in four 
states (Arizona, Florida, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin) from the AHA’s Annual 
Survey of Hospitals. They apply multivariate regression models to examine the 
impact of system consolidation on quality of care using measures such as inpatient 
mortality rate, overused procedures rate, and adverse patient safety rate. The authors 
report that while overused procedures rate decreases by 1.2 percentage points, 
avoidable inpatient mortality and inadequate patient safety rates do not change. 
Cuellar and Gertler (2003) conclude that system consolidation has little or no effect 
on inpatient quality of care, and even if hospitals gain higher prices, they do not use 
this to enhance their quality of inpatient care.  
The study done by Capps (2005) also demonstrates that hospital mergers have 
little effect on quality of care. Utilizing the data from AHA and Medicare Cost 
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Reports in New York State between 1995 and 2000 and the quality indicators from 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), Capps (2005) applies the DID 
approach to estimate the effects of hospital mergers on quality of care in 25 merging 
hospitals. Capps (2005) uses two approaches to select the control group: use of 
non-merging cardiac hospitals as control group and use of propensity scoring similar 
to the method used in the study of Dranove and Lindrooth (2003) to select control 
group of non-merging hospitals that are similar to merging hospitals. The results 
derived from comparing to two different control groups of non-merging hospitals 
demonstrate that hospitals mergers do not improve quality of care. However, Capps 
(2005) indicates that the method of selecting control groups may affect the statistical 
significance of the results. As such, Capps (2005) suggests future analyses built on a 
larger sample of merging hospitals and control groups may help derive more reliable 
conclusions.    
Romano and Balan (2010) apply DID analysis to investigate the changes in 
quality of care after a merger, using data from the Illinois Department of Public 
Health Universal Dataset from 1998 to 2003. Unlike other studies, Romano and Balan 
(2010) examine one particular merger case, the acquisition of Highland Park Hospital 
(HPH) by Evanston Northwestern Healthcare hospital system (EH) near Chicago. 
Romano and Balan (2010) use quality measures such as Inpatient Mortality Indicators 
(IQIs) and the Patient Safety Indicators (PSIs) to analyze patient outcomes after the 
merger. They compare the rates of the merged hospitals with a set of control hospitals 
in the Chicago area. Romano and Balan (2010) find while most of the quality 
indicators show statistically insignificant or mixed results, some depict significant 
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deterioration. For instance, the researchers (2010) find that the quality of care for 
pneumonia mortality (0.3% and 3.14%) and stroke mortality (2.42% and 4.94%) both 
deteriorate at both HPH and EH after the merger. They conclude that hospital mergers 
do not improve quality of care.  
Mutter et al. (2011) identify 42 hospital consolidations involving 136 hospitals in 
16 states between 1999 and 2000 from the journal Modern Healthcare. They apply 
DID models to analyze the effects of hospital consolidation on inpatient quality of 
care using 25 quality indicators. Mutter et al. (2011) find that the effects of hospital 
consolidation on inpatient quality of care are minimal and vary across different 
quality measures and among the roles of the hospitals in a merger. For instance, 
Mutter et al. (2011) report that acquiring hospitals have significantly lower rates of 
iatrogenic pneumothorax than target hospitals after consolidation, and target hospitals’ 
rates of obstetric trauma for vaginal deliveries with instrumentation increase 
significantly, while those of the hospitals that are in “mergers of equals” decrease 
(P.121). Mutter et al. (2011) suggest that hospitals’ roles and the quality measures 
hospitals apply lead to different results of quality effects associated with mergers. 
However, Mutter et al. (2011) conclude that while evidence depicts that acquiring 
hospitals may increase slightly in certain quality measures, consolidations in general 
do not have a consistent impact on quality of care.  
In addition, studies have indicated that high volume of health services provided 
by hospitals is associated with better patient outcomes (Halm et al., 2002; Livingston 
and Cao, 2010). A review done by Halm et al. (2002) demonstrates that high hospital 
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and physician volume is in general related to better patient outcomes for various 
procedures and conditions. Using the MEDLINE database, Halm et al. (2002) identify 
135 studies published between 1980 and 2000 that examine the association between 
hospital and physician volume with patient outcomes. Among the 135 studies 
examined, 107 studies use inpatient mortality rate as the primary patient outcome 
while the remaining studies use other outcomes such as stroke or other neurologic 
outcomes (Halm et al., 2002). Halm et al. (2002) apply chi-square tests to examine the 
association between positive results and methodologic characteristics. Halm et al. 
(2002) conclude that while hospital and physician volume is significantly associated 
with patient outcomes, the magnitude and consistency of such association differ 
significantly. Moreover, they find that such association is mostly significant and 
consistent for procedures and conditions such as pancreatic cancer, esophageal cancer, 
pediatric cardiac problems and the treatment of AIDS (Halm et al., 2002).   
 
Literature review on association of hospital ownership, level, location and quality 
of care 
 Eggleston et al. (2008) perform a systematic review and meta-analysis on 31 
empirical studies which examine the association of hospital ownership and quality of 
care. These 31 hospitals include at least two of the three ownership forms: 
government-owned, private not-for-profit and private for-profit. Of the 31 studies 
included in the meta-analysis, 25 use mortality rates while 13 apply other adverse 
patient outcomes. The sample years of these 31 studies range from 1984 to 2001.   
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Eggleston et al. (2008) find that studies that are representative of the entire US 
demonstrate that government-owned hospitals are significantly associated with higher 
mortality and adverse events rates than private not-for-private hospitals. However, 
Eggleston et al. (2008) indicate that such an association is systematically different in 
accordance with a study’s data source, study period, and region studied. They find that 
studies which use state administrative databases from 1990 or later, hospital samples 
from a single state or modelling that excludes market competition show no difference 
in patient outcomes. Thus for further research, Eggleston et al. (2008) recommend an 
in-depth research on organizational decision-making and market-level changes of 
various economies to better analyze the association of hospital ownership and quality 
of care.    
 Hsieh and Cheng (2011) examine hospital location, hospital level and quality for 
acute coronary syndrome (ACS) patients using performance indicators for ACS. 
Hsieh and Cheng use patient data consisting of 2,388 ACS patients treated at 14 
participating hospitals located in the northern, central and southern Taiwan between 
2006 and 2007. Quality is measured by 12 quality indicators for ACS. Hsieh and 
Cheng (2011) find that southern Taiwan hospitals are significantly associated with 
better quality in terms of higher utilization rate of therapies recommended by the 
guidelines than the hospitals in northern and central Taiwan. However, Hsieh and 
Cheng (2011) indicate that hospitals in central Taiwan are generally associated with 
the worst quality mostly. In addition, Hsieh and Cheng (2011) also examine the 
association between hospital type and quality. They find that medical centers are 
associated with better quality than regional hospitals. 
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 Another study done by Lin et al. (2003) also examines the association between 
hospital characteristics and quality of care. Lin et al. (2003) use patient level data 
consisting of 5,456 patients with vaginal delivery from the NHI Research Database in 
1999 and maternity length of stay as a quality measure. Lin et al. (2003) find that 
length of stay is significantly associated with hospital level, hospital ownership, 
hospital location, and teaching status. Moreover, Lin et al. (2003) indicate that 
medical centers or regional hospitals are significantly associated with a higher length 
of stay than district hospitals. Also, public hospitals are significantly associated with 
longer lengths of stay than private hospitals. Furthermore, patients who give birth in 
northern Taiwan hospitals have significantly longer stays than those stay in central or 
southern Taiwan hospitals. For future research, Lin et al. (2003) suggest further 
investigation on the potential effects of the reduction in length of stay on the health 
condition of infants.  
 In contrast to Lin et al. (2003), a study done by Chang (2011) only uses public 
hospital which located in Taipei to examine the factors associated with quality. Chang 
(2011) examines what factors have impact on quality of care before and after the 
implementation of the National Health Insurance program, using fixed effect model 
and data of a total of 153 public hospitals located in Taipei for the period between 
1989 and 2002. Chang (2011) uses morality rates and infection rates as dependent 
variables. The study’s independent variables include market factors (i.e. population 
aged 65 and above, market share, household income, total number of family, size of 
family, education, and family medical expenses), operational factors (i.e. beds, 
occupancy rates, average length of stay, new technology, doctors’ density, nurses to 
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beds, and total operational costs/total sales), and financial factors (debt structure, and 
subsidy/sales). Chang (2011) finds that quality of care after the implementation of 
NHI has not improved and population over 65, competition, new technology, length 
of stay, the number of beds, doctors’ density and nurses’ density are associated with 
quality of care. Moreover, Chang (2011) concludes that lower doctors and nurses’ 
density, longer length of stay, and increased aging population cause the quality of care 
to deteriorate. For future research, Chang (2011) suggests to examine the association 
further by using more quality indicators and larger sample size which includes private 




The data on hospital quality of care is mainly from the website of the Ministry of 
Health and Welfare which provides a total of forty quality indicators including 
outcome and process of care measures. However, not all measures are applicable to all 
of the hospitals in Taiwan as some of the indicators measure the quality of care for 
specific conditions or illnesses such as the survival rates after organ implants, usage 
rate for certain drugs such as Aldosterone antagonist, or the rate of psychiatric patients 
returning to hospitals within 30 days of discharge. Furthermore, some hospitals may 
not provide the care or services measured by some indicators, thus not all hospitals 
are included in some measures. Moreover, because many of the quality indicators 
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contain incomplete yearly information (eg. only Q3 to Q4 or Q 2 to Q4 for some years 
or a particular year), this study only uses the indicators that have complete yearly 
information. Seven of the quality measures which are related to the services that are 
common in the majority of hospitals in Taiwan are used for this study. These quality 
measures include mainly process measures: 
1. The emergency department visit rate for Acute Myocardial Infarction (AMI) 
patients who returned to the hospital within 3 days after discharge (AMI) 
2. The rate for outpatients revisiting the same hospital the same day after being 
treated for the same disease (Revisit) 
3. The percentage of patients admitted to acute beds for more than 30 days 
(Acute) 
4. The percentage of patients staying in the emergency room for more than 48 
hours before being admitted (ER48) 
5. The percentage of use of antibiotics for over 3 days after debridement 
(Antibio3) 
6. The rate of emergency department visits for patients who return to the hospital 
within 3 days of discharge (ER3) 
7. The percentage of patients being treated in the emergency room returning to 
the emergency room the same day after being treated. (ER1) 
 
Based on the availability of the data compiled by the Ministry of Health and 
Welfare (MOHW) and the literature, the study includes hospital variables such as 
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merged/non-merged hospitals, ownership (i.e. public/private), hospital level based on 
their accreditation (i.e. medical center, regional hospital, or district hospital), hospital 
location, acute bed number, and the number of hospitals in the same marketplace. In 
addition, for measuring the intensity of competition such as HHI, data on hospital 
discharges is unavailable for all hospitals and thus the study only applies the number 
of hospitals in the marketplace to measure density of competition. The data covers a 
period of four years (2011-2014) and contains a total number of 106 hospitals that are 
located in northern, central, and southern Taiwan. The northern region includes Taipei 
City, New Taipei City, Keelung City, and Yilan City. The central region includes 
Taichung City, Changhwa City, and Nantou City. The southern region includes 
Kaohsiung City and Pingtung City. These locations are chosen because they have 
Taiwan’s highest populous cities - New Taipei City, Kaohsiung City, Taichung City 
and Taipei City (World Population Review, 2016). Moreover, of the 106 hospitals, 
there are 15 medical centers, 43, regional hospitals, and 48 district hospitals. From 
this group, there are 35 public and 71 private hospitals; 42 are located in northern 
Taiwan, 40 in southern Taiwan, and 24 in central Taiwan.  
Table 4.1 shows the descriptive statistics of hospitals based on levels, and 4.2 









Statistical analysis is performed using SPSS version 23.0 (SPSS INC., Chicago, 
IL, USA). Generalized Linear Mixed Model (GLMM) is used in this study as the 
continuous outcomes are non-normally distributed. GLMM is an extension of 
generalized linear model, as indicated by the term ‘linear’ (Garson, 2013). As the term 
‘generalized’ suggests, GLMM can handle outcomes of different types with various 
distributional assumptions such as normal or binomial or Poisson (McCulloch and 
Neuhaus, 2015). Moreover, as the term ‘mixed’ illustrates, GLMM includes both 
fixed and random predictors and relates the outcome to the linear predictors via a 
specified link function which describes how the dependent variable relates to the 
linear predictors (Kachman, 2016, MathWorks, 2016). In this study, GLMM is applied 
with an identity-link function which can be used for any distribution to model the 
mean directly (IBM SPSS, 2013). As the data on the quality measures is skewed, the 
natural logarithm is taken to transform the data in order to normalize the distributions 
before the analysis. Moreover, 0.01 adds to the zero values so that they would not be 
excluded in the analysis.  
The unstructured covariance type is used as it makes no assumptions about the 
variances and covariances (Fitzmaurice et al., 2011) and often provides the best fit 
(Shek and Ma, 2011). Moreover, both the Akaike Information Criterion depicts the 
smallest values for the unstructured covariance type, suggesting that it is the 
preferable model. Moreover, the Bonferroni’s method is used for multiple 
comparisons. It is used to avoid the chances of obtaining false-positive results (type I 
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errors) when performing multiple pair wise tests on the same data set (Napierala, 
2016). Furthermore, significance of association is defined as P < 0.05. 
Four subgroups are created and analyzed separately. These four subgroups are: 
public vs private hospitals, hospitals located in the three different locations (north, 
central and south), hospitals categorized by the three different levels (medical center, 
regional, and district hospitals) and merged vs non-merged hospitals. Several factors 
are also included for the subgroup analyses such as the number of hospitals in the 
same district, number of acute beds, occupancy rate for acute beds, hospital 
ownership, hospital level, merger, and hospital location. 
 
Results 
Table 4.1 provides a summary of the hospitals’ characteristics such as the number 
of acute beds, the annual averaged occupancy rate of the acute beds, and the seven 
quality indicators. Table 4.2 illustrates summary characteristics of hospitals based on 
hospital level, Table 4.3 is based on hospital ownership, Table 4.4 is based on 
merged/non-merged hospitals, and Table 4.5 is based on hospital location. Table 4.6 
depicts the association between hospital factors and quality of care based on merger, 
hospital level, ownership, and location. The following table provides a summary of 
the findings on the association of hospital merger, ownership, level, location and 
quality in terms of the seven measures. 
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Summary table based the results illustrated in the following paragraphs: 
Quality 
Indicator 
Merger Ownership Level Location 
AMI  P-value < 0.05 P-value < 0.05 P-value < 0.05 
Revisit   P-value < 0.05 P-value < 0.05 
Acute  P-value < 0.05 P-value < 0.05 P-value < 0.05 
ER48   P-value < 0.05  
ER3   P-value < 0.05 P-value < 0.05 
ER1    P-value < 0.05 
Antibio3     
 
Comparisons of hospitals in each factor: 
Hospitals Higher rates 
(lower quality) 





 Merged ER48, ER1, Antibio3 
 
AMI, Revisit, Acute, ER3 
Mixed 
Non-merged AMI, Revisit, Acute, ER3 
 
ER48, ER1, Antibio3 
Mixed 
Ownership 
 Private  AMI, Revisit 
 
Good 
 Public AMI, Revisit, Acute, ER48, 
ER3, ER1, Antibio3 
 
 Bad   
Level Highest rates 
(Worst quality) 




 Medical CTR Revisit, Acute, 
ER48, ER3, ER1 
 
AMI Antibio3 Worst 
 Regional AMI, Antibio3 Revisit, Acute, 
ER48, ER3 
 
ER1   
 District  ER1, Antibio3 AMI, Revisit, 














 Southern  Acute, ER48, 
ER3, Antibio3  
AMI, Revisit, ER1  Best 
 




As depicted in Table 4.6 and the above tables, the results show mixed (i.e. both 
positive and negative effects) results. Merger is insignificantly associated with all 
quality measures (P > 0.05). However, the multiple comparison shows that merged 
hospitals depict insignificant lower rates (better quality) in terms of measures such as 
AMI, Revisit, Acute, and ER3, while non-merged hospitals have insignificant lower 
rates (better quality) in terms of measures such as ER48, ER1, and Antibio3. Although 
these results may suggest that hospital mergers affect quality of care in different areas 
(Mutter et al., 2008), they do depict that hospital merger does not have an overall 
positive impact on quality of care. Furthermore, while empirical findings provide 
mixed evidence, the majority of studies demonstrate that hospitals mergers reduce 
quality of care (Williams et al., 2006).  
Ownership 
 The above tables show that hospital ownership is significantly associated with 
quality in terms of AMI and Acute. However, for all measures, public hospital 
ownership is associated with higher rates (poorer quality) than private hospital 
ownership. This may suggest that public hospitals in the dataset are less efficient in 
providing process care than private hospitals. This result is consistent with literature 
that public hospitals have poorer quality of care than private hospitals. To improve the 
quality of public hospitals, one solution may be to privatize these hospitals. This will 
be discussed in greater details in the discussion section.       
 
EFFECTS OF MERGERS AND HOSPITAL FACTORS ON HOSPTIAL COSTS AND QUALITY  
74 
 
Hospital level  
As Table 4.6 and the above tables illustrate, all three hospital levels are 
significantly associated with quality indicators in terms of AMI, Revisit, Acute, ER3, 
and ER48. Besides AMI, medical centers significantly show the highest rates, 
followed by the regional and district hospitals. However, this may be because medical 
centers in general receive patients with more severe and complex conditions than 
hospitals, and thus result in higher quality measures. Alternatively, it may be due to 
the overcrowding problem in large hospitals (see Discussion section). For the AMI 
rate, regional hospitals have the highest rate, followed by medical centers, and district 
hospitals. This result is consistent with prior research that also finds regional hospitals 
have higher inpatient AMI mortality rate than medical centers (Liu et al., 2014). 
However, the researchers indicate that the reason that regional hospitals have higher 
AMI mortality rate may not be mainly due to the differences in hospital levels but the 
cardiologist service volume and percutaneous coronary intervention performed in the 
hospitals (Ibid). Thus such association can be further investigated when more detailed 
hospital data such as the cardiologist service volume and the number of percutaneous 
coronary intervention performed is made available. In general, medical centers and 
regional hospitals are significantly associated with higher rates (poorer quality) than 
district hospitals.   
Location  
 Table 4.6 and the above tables depict that there is significant association between 
hospital locations and quality in terms of AMI, Revisit, Acute, ER3, and ER1. Among 
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these measures, hospitals in the southern region are significantly associated with the 
highest quality (lowest rates) on AMI, Revisit, Acute, and ER1. While hospitals in 
central region are significantly associated with the worst quality (highest rates) for 
AMI, Revisit, and ER1, and hospitals in northern region are associated with 
significantly worst quality (highest rates) on Acute and ER3. Moreover, hospitals in 
central region are significantly associated with the highest quality (lowest rates) in 
ER3. In generally, hospitals in the southern locations are significantly associated with 
better quality than the other two locations.  
 
Subgroup Analysis: association of competition, acute bed size and quality 
 Research depicts that hospital size and competition affect quality of care 
(Brownlee and Saini, 2014; Whiet et al., 2014; Dash and Meredith, 2010). Empirical 
evidence indicates that bigger hospitals have higher prices but they do not necessarily 
offer better quality of care (Brownlee and Saini, 2014; Whiet et al., 2014). However, 
empirical evidence does not provide consistent findings on the association of hospital 
competition and quality. The reason that hospital competition does not improve 
quality of care may be due to information symmetry between providers and patients, 
moral hazard, adverse selection (Dash and Meredith, 2010). Therefore, this study also 
examines the association between hospital size, competition and quality of care in the 
subgroup analysis. The following table briefly summarizes the results from the 
subgroup analysis on the association of hospital size, competition and quality of care. 
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Results from the subgroup analysis: 
Hospital 
+beds 
AMI Revisit Acute ER48 ER3 ER1 Antibio3 +Competition 
Merged 
       
x 
Non-M  + + + +   x 
 
Private + + + + +   x 
Public  + + +    -ER1 
 
Med Ctr   +    + x 
Regional   +     x 
District  + + +    x 
 
Northern  + + +    x 
Southern  + + + +   x 
Central  +  + +   x 
+ = significantly positive; x = insignificant 
Private/Public hospitals 
 Table 4.7 to Table 4.13 and the above table show the results on the relationships 
between competition, the number of acute beds and quality for public and private 
hospital ownerships. There is a significantly positive association between the number 
of acute beds and quality on all measures except Antibio3 and ER1 for private 
hospital ownership. However, for public hospital ownership, the number of acute beds 
is only significantly and positively associated with quality in terms of Acute, Revisit, 
and ER48. In general, both private and public hospital ownerships with a larger 
number of acute beds have poorer quality than those with a small number of acute 
beds.   
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Moreover, there is a mixed (both negative and positive) association between 
competition and quality on all measures for both public and private hospital 
ownerships. Besides ER1, all results on the association of competition and quality for 
both ownerships are insignificant. For public hospital ownership, there is a negative 
and significant association between the number of competitors and quality in terms of 
ER1. This suggests that when there is more competition, public hospitals have better 
quality in terms of reducing the number of patients returning to ER on the same day 
after discharging from the same ER than private hospital ownership. However, in 
terms of quality for all measures, private hospitals are not likely to be affected by the 




Table 4.14 to Table 4.20 and the above table show the results on the association 
between competition, the number of acute beds and quality for merged and 
non-merged hospitals. The results indicate that non-merged hospitals are associated 
with a significantly positive association between the number of acute beds and quality 
on the four process measures: Acute, Revisit, ER3, and ER48. This suggests that 
non-merged hospitals with a higher number of the acute beds are associated with 
significantly lower quality on these measures. However, for merged hospitals, the 
association between the number of acute beds and quality is insignificant. In general, 
for both merged and non-merged hospitals, the association between competition and 
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quality is insignificant and mixed which includes both positive and negative effects. 
This suggests that the effect of competition on the quality of both merged and 
non-merged hospitals is mixed. 
Medical centers/regional hospitals/district hospitals 
  Table 4.21 to Table 4.27 and the above table illustrate the results on the 
relationships between competition, the number of acute beds and quality for medical 
centers, regional hospitals, and district hospitals. In the area of Acute for all levels of 
hospitals, there is a significantly positive association between the number of acute 
beds and quality. This suggests that the higher number of acute beds there are, then 
the poorer the quality in treating patients with acute diseases regardless of whether the 
hospital is a medical center, regional, or district hospital. Moreover, only district 
hospitals have a significant and positive association between the number of acute beds 
and quality in terms of Revisit and ER48. Only medical centers show significantly 
positive associations between the number of acute beds and quality in terms of 
Antibio3. Furthermore, there is an insignificant association between the number of 
acute beds and quality in terms of measures besides Acute for the regional hospitals. 
With regards to competition, there is insignificant and mixed (both positive and 
negative) association between competition and quality for all types of hospitals. 
Northern/Southern/Central Taiwan hospitals 
Table 4.28 to Table 4.34 and the above table illustrate the results on the 
relationships between competition, the number of acute beds and quality for hospitals 
located in the three different locations: northern, central, and southern Taiwan. There 
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is a significant and positive association between the number of acute beds and quality 
only in terms of Revisit and ER 48 (crowding in emergency rooms) for all locations. 
This suggests that hospitals in all locations with a higher number of acute beds are 
significantly associated with higher rates of Revisit. Moreover, hospitals in both 
northern and southern Taiwan with more acute beds are significantly associated with 
higher rates of Acute. For quality in terms of ER3, the association is significant and 
positive for both hospitals in the southern and central regions. For other measures, the 
association between the number of acute beds and quality is also positive yet 
insignificant. Furthermore, hospitals in all the locations have insignificant and mixed 
associations between competition and quality on all measures. 
       
Discussion 
 In this study, the association between hospitals and quality based on 
merged/non-merged, ownership, location, and level is examined. Also, subgroup 
analyses on the relationship between competition, the number of acute beds and 
quality are conducted. The results show that a hospital’s quality may be affected 
differently by the hospital’s ownership, merger, level, and location. In general, results 
found in this study are consistent with the findings of existing literature examining the 
healthcare industry in Taiwan. For example, the results in this study demonstrate that 
hospitals with more acute beds such are associated with higher rates (poorer quality) 
in most quality measures. This result is consistent with existing findings (Lin et al., 
2003). Moreover, the poorer quality found in medical centers and regional hospitals 
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could be due to the overcrowding of patients with minor conditions in medical centers 
and regional hospitals (Cheng, Y.W., 2015). As patients have easy access and freedom 
of choice to seek care in Taiwan (Cheng, T.M., 2015), they are used to seeking care in 
medical centers and regional hospitals even when they only have minor illnesses 
(Wang and Cheng, 2005). Consequently, such situations obstruct medical centers or 
regional hospitals from providing timely and adequate care to patients with more 
complex and acute illnesses (Wang and Cheng, 2005). Moreover, the higher rates 
observed in both medical centers and regional hospitals may partly be due to the fact 
that they are more likely to receive a higher proportion of patients with more complex 
and acute illnesses than district hospitals (Lin et al., 2003).  
All levels of hospitals are significantly associated with quality of care in terms of 
Revisit, ER48, and Acute. This result is consistent with the report called the 2014 
Population Healthcare Quality Indicator Report done by MOHW. In this report, the 
performance of hospitals in Taiwan is compared to that of OECD countries. Taiwan is 
rated with the worst grades (D) in these areas (Cheng, 2015): Doctors spend enough 
time with patients on visits; and Doctors’ communication with patients is easily 
understandable. This suggests that the reason that all hospitals are significantly 
associated with quality on Revisit could be because of the insufficient time spent on 
each visit to achieve effective communication between patients and doctors. Thus 
patients return to the same hospitals on the same day for treatment with the same 
illness after visiting. Moreover, the result on the significant association with ER48 for 
all hospitals is consistent with literature and such emergency room overcrowding 
problem may result from the low costs of ED visits and the aging populations since 
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older patients tend to have more urgent visits and longer stays in the ER (Yang et al., 
2009). Furthermore, the high Acute rates may result from the inappropriate or 
unnecessary use of inpatient services as research examining the appropriateness of 
hospital stay longer than 30 days in acute care hospitals finds that a significant 
percentage of hospital bed days has been used for patients without further medical 
needs (Chiu et al., 2003). The researchers conclude that larger hospitals have higher 
percentages of such inappropriate-stay patients and this may be due to hospital factors, 
patient characteristics, and the payment schemes of NHI (Ibid).  
The effect of competition on quality depicts mixed and insignificant results. Both 
merged and non-merged hospitals have insignificant and mixed (both positive and 
negative) association with quality of care. However, the results are consistent with the 
findings of existing literature that demonstrates mixed results on the association 
between hospital competition and quality of care (Bijlsma et al., 2010; Mutter et al., 
2008; Propper et al., 2008; Palangkaraya and Yong, 2013). Similarly, the association 
between merged, non-merged hospitals and quality also shows mixed results which 
are consistent with those of various studies that examine the effect of hospital merger 
on quality ((Capps, 2005; Cuellar and Gertler, 2003; Mutter et al., 2011; Romano and 
Balan, 2010).   
For all measures, public hospital ownership is associated with poorer quality than 
private hospital ownership. This finding is consistent with the findings of existing 
literature (Chang et al., 2004; Eggleston et al., 2008). For Taiwan, the findings 
observed in this study may have resulted from public hospitals’ lack of supportive 
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supervision and continued reduction of subsidies from the government (Cheng, 2011). 
On the contrary, private hospitals are mostly owned by large business conglomerates 
with sufficient funding for investment in medical technology, expansion in operating 
facilities (Ibid). Since usage of advanced technology is associated with better quality 
of care (Chang, 2011), private hospitals are thus more likely to sustain a good quality 
of care. Moreover, policy makers may privatize the public hospitals to improve the 
quality of public hospitals, as research demonstrates that private hospitals improve 
quality management and hospital outcomes (Busse et al., 2009). Indeed, researchers 
examining the outcomes of privatization of public hospitals find evidence that 
privatization leads to efficiency gains and better quality (Tiemann and Schreyogg, 
2012). 
The study includes hospital locations in northern, central and southern Taiwan to 
examine whether quality differs geographically. The study finds that southern Taiwan 
hospitals are significantly associated with higher quality of care compared to hospitals 
in the central and northern Taiwan. Although, using different quality indicators, this 
study finds results consistent to existing literature (Hsieh and Chen, 2011). The reason 
that southern Taiwan’s hospitals demonstrate better quality may contribute to their 
practice in accordance with guidelines and industry standards. However, as Hsieh and 
Cheng (2011) indicate, the association of geographical differences and quality of care 
needs to be investigated further. The inclusion of patient data, more detailed hospital 
level data, and other quality measures may help substantiate the findings.  
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 This study has limitations. Due to the limited access to relevant hospital data, 
this study does not include information and data such as average length of stay, 
average occupancy, CMI, and annual discharges for all hospitals in every year for the 
period of statistical analysis. As such, this may influence the robustness of the study 
results. Also, the existing quality measures included in this study may not represent all 
quality aspects and the range of quality measures used in this study is relatively small. 
Therefore, further research that includes other outcomes measures could add greater 
validation to the study’s robustness. Furthermore, in future research, this study can be 
expanded by including a larger sample of hospitals across all regions in Taiwan, more 
detailed hospital and patient level data, and outcome measures spanning a longer 
period of time. This would help substantiate the findings.   
 
Conclusion
This is the first study to examine the relationships between hospital ownership, 
merged/non-merged, levels, and locations with quality in terms of process measures 
using the hospital level data. As there is limited current research on quality of care in 
the context of Taiwan, this study serves as a foundation for further research. Based on 
the findings of this study, there is still room for further improvement in terms of the 
overall quality of all hospitals. The study finds hospital ownerships, levels, and 
locations are associated with quality in terms of certain process measures. However, 
the study finds insignificant and mixed relationships between hospital competition, 
mergers and quality. Moreover, the study finds significant association between the 
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number of acute beds and quality. Larger hospitals depict weaker quality in terms of 
certain measures shown in the results section. Furthermore, the evidence shows that 
public hospitals have poorer quality. While this study finds that ownership, level, and 
location are associated with quality, the important implications underlying such 
associations highlight the fundamental problems pertaining to each type of hospitals. 
These problems may have originated from public policies, management practices, and 
hospital culture. However, in view of the growing aging population and the increasing 
medical needs, policy attention to address the fundamental issues pertaining to these 




Table 4.1 Summary statistics of all hospitals, 2011-2014  
Descriptive Statistics 
 
N* Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
NoCompetitor  424 0 13 3.45 2.86 
Acutebeds♠ 424 27 3093 503.70 537.46 
Acuteocuppy╬ 314 14.58 93.87 64.53 16.56 
AMI† 424 .00 100.00 8.53 16.40 
Revisit◊ 424 .01 2.64 .82 .49 
Acute% 420 .00 4.82 1.34 .91 
ER48¶ 420 .00 28.01 2.26 4.97 
ER3# 420 .00 5.96 1.80 1.22 
ER1☼ 420 .00 4.03 .47 .62 
Antibio3‡ 420 .00 100.00 20.86 19.90 
 
♠ = The number of acute beds in a hospital 
╬ = The occupancy rate of acute beds in a hospital 
† = Emergency department visit rate for Acute Myocardial Infarction (AMI) patients who returned 
to the hospital within 3 days after discharge 
◊ = Rate for outpatients revisiting the same hospital the same day after being treated for the same 
disease 
% = The percentage of patients staying in acute beds for more than 30 days 
¶ = Percentage of patients staying in emergency room (ER) for more than 48 hours before being 
admitted  
# = Percentage of ER visits of patients who return to the hospital after 3 days of discharge 
☼ = Percentage of patients returning to ER the same day after being treated in the ER  
‡ = Percentage of patients receiving antibiotic treatment for more than 3 days after debridement 
*N contains data for 4 years and thus each number needs to be divided by four. Odd numbers are 




Table 4.2 Summary of quality indicators based on hospital levels 
 
Type3! N* Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
1.00 AMI† 60 .00 3.38 1.19 .94 
Revisit◊ 60 .65 2.60 1.26 .48 
Acute% 60 .98 3.92 2.20 .74 
ER48¶ 60 .02 28.01 9.51 7.54 
ER3# 60 1.08 5.62 2.25 .72 
ER1☼ 60 .01 3.67 .50 .81 
Antibio3‡ 60 1.28 24.29 7.72 4.71 
Acutebeds♠ 60 618 2805 1355.72 613.03 
Acuteocuppy╬ 45 54.52 89.90 79.43 9.39 
NoCompetitor  60 0 13 3.87 3.23 
        
AMI 171 .00 42.86 4.55 6.33 
2.00 Revisit 171 .25 2.64 .934 .44 
Acute 171 .09 4.82 1.38 .83 
ER48 171 .00 16.20 1.21 2.97 
ER3 171 .00 5.96 2.12 .96 
ER1 171 .00 2.28 .43 .34 
Antibio3 171 .00 64.48 20.15 15.20 
Acutebeds 171 183 3093 583.23 416.21 
Acuteocuppy 129 35.42 88.17 65.26 13.61 
NoCompetitor 171 0 10 3.53 3.02 
      
AMI 193 .00 100.00 14.33 22.18 
Revisit 193           .01       2.51  .59 .41 
3.00 Acute 189 .00 4.59 1.02 .84 
 ER48 189 .00 20.16 .92 3.09 
 ER3 189 .00 5.62 1.37 1.40 
 ER1 189 .00 4.03 .51 .73 
 Antibio3 189 .00 100.00 25.67 24.25 
 Acutebeds 193 27 1043 168.35 148.38 
 Acuteocuppy 140 14.58 93.87 59.06 17.79 
 NoCompetitor 193 0 10 3.25 2.50 
!1 = medical centers; 2 = regional hospitals; 3 = district hospitals 
*N contains data for 4 years and thus each number needs to be divided by four. Odd numbers are due to 
missing values. 
† = Emergency department visit rate for Acute Myocardial Infarction (AMI) patients who returned to 
the hospital within 3 days after discharge 
◊ = Rate for outpatients revisiting the same hospital the same day after being treated for the same 
disease;  
% = The percentage of patients staying in acute beds for more than 30 days 
‡ = Percentage of patients receiving antibiotic treatment for more than 3 days after debridement 
EFFECTS OF MERGERS AND HOSPITAL FACTORS ON HOSPTIAL COSTS AND QUALITY  
87 
 
¶ = Percentage of patients staying in emergency room (ER) for more than 48 hours before being 
admitted;  
 = The number of hospitals in the market; 
♠ = The number of acute beds in a hospital 
╬ = The occupancy rate of acute beds in a hospital  
# = Percentage of ER visits of patients who return to the hospital after 3 days of discharge 









Table 4.3 Summary of quality indicators based on hospital ownership 
Descriptive Statistics 
Hospital ownership  N* Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
0 AMI† 284 .00 100.00 7.56 15.54 
Revisit◊ 284 .01 2.64 .81 .51 
Acute% 280 .00 4.82 1.10 .83 
ER48¶ 280 .00 23.03 1.89 4.22 
ER3# 280 .00 5.96 1.69 1.29 
ER1☼ 280 .00 3.74 .48 .65 
Antibio3‡ 280 .00 100.00 20.76 19.59 
Acutebeds♠ 284 27 1833 422.62 404.94 
Acuteocuppy╬ 209 14.58 93.87 64.21 16.97 
NoCompetitor  284 0 13 3.51 2.90 
        
1 AMI 140 .00 100.00 10.48 17.92 
 
Revisit 140 .20 2.60 .84 .45 
 
Acute 140 .07 4.59 1.80 .88 
 
ER48 140 .00 28.01 3.02 6.14 
 
ER3 140 .00 4.70 2.04 1.01 
 
ER1 140 .00 4.03 .46 .55 
 
Antibio3 140 .00 95.56 21.05 20.56 
 
Acutebeds 140 97 3093 668.16 710.31 
 
Acuteocuppy 105 30.90 89.10 65.15 15.77 
 
NoCompetitor 140 0 10 3.32 2.69 
 0 = private hospitals; 1 = public hospitals  
* = needs to be divided by 4 because the data contains a period of 4 years. Odd numbers are due to missing values. 
 = The number of hospitals in the market 
♠ = The number of acute beds in a hospital 
╬ = The occupancy rate of acute beds in a hospital 
† = Emergency department visit rate for Acute Myocardial Infarction (AMI) patients who returned 
to the hospital within 3 days after discharge 
◊ = Rate for outpatients revisiting the same hospital the same day after being treated for the same 
disease 
% = The percentage of patients staying in acute beds for more than 30 days 
¶ = Percentage of patients staying in emergency room (ER) for more than 48 hours before being 
admitted  
# = Percentage of ER visits of patients who return to the hospital after 3 days of discharge 
‡ = Percentage of patients receiving antibiotic treatment for more than 3 days after debridement 
☼ = Percentage of patients returning to ER the same day after being treated in the ER 
EFFECTS OF MERGERS AND HOSPITAL FACTORS ON HOSPTIAL COSTS AND QUALITY  
89 
 




Hosp♫ N* Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
.00 AMI† 412 .00 100.00 8.69 16.60 
Revisit◊ 412 .01 2.64 .83 .50 
Acute% 408 .00 4.82 1.33 .91 
ER48¶ 408 .00 28.01 2.32 5.03 
ER3# 408 .00 5.96 1.79 1.23 
ER1☼ 408 .00 4.03 .47 .62 
Antibio3‡ 408 .00 100.00 20.93 20.16 
Acutebeds♠ 412 27 2805 482.90 488.95 
Acuteocuppy╬ 305 14.58 93.87 64.81 16.61 
NoCompetitor  412 0 13 3.47 2.86 
      
1.00 AMI 12 .00 8.62 2.93 3.34 
 
Revisit 12 .41 1.52 .58 .29 
 
Acute 12 .43 2.73 1.52 .89 
 
ER48 12 .00 1.13 .34 .42 
 
ER3 12 1.50 2.97 2.13 .55 
 
ER1 12 .10 .88 .64 .27 
 
Antibio3 12 9.17 30.00 18.52 6.26 
 
Acutebeds 12 325 3093 1217.58 1266.22 
 
Acuteocuppy 9 37.95 65.40 54.82 11.49 
 
NoCompetitor 12 0 4 2.92 1.62 
♫ .00 = non-merged hospitals; 1.00 = merged hospitals 
* Number needs to be divided by 4 because the data contains a period of 4 years.  Odd numbers are due to 
missing values 
 = The number of hospitals in the market 
♠ = The number of acute beds in a hospital 
╬ = The occupancy rate of acute beds in a hospital 
† = Emergency department visit rate for Acute Myocardial Infarction (AMI) patients who returned 
to the hospital within 3 days after discharge 
◊ = Rate for outpatients revisiting the same hospital the same day after being treated for the same 
disease 
% = The percentage of patients staying in acute beds for more than 30 days 
¶ = Percentage of patients staying in emergency room (ER) for more than 48 hours before being 
admitted  
# = Percentage of ER visits of patients who return to the hospital after 3 days of discharge 
☼ = Percentage of patients returning to ER the same day after being treated in the ER  
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Table 4.5 Summary on quality indicators based on locations 
area3& N* Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
11.00 AMI† 168 .00 100.00 9.2 17.24 
Revisit◊ 168 .09 2.60 .84 .43 
Acute% 168 .00 4.82 1.62 .90 
ER48¶ 168 .00 28.01 3.10 5.94 
ER3# 168 .00 5.10 2.36 .99 
ER1☼ 168 .00 4.03 .39 .53 
Antibio3‡ 168 .00 100.00 20.06 17.69 
Acutebeds♠ 168 82 3093 602.87 668.78 
Cardiolo§ 165 1 41 11.03 10.15 
Acuteocuppy╬ 126 23.56 88.60 64.93 17.82 
NoCompetitor  168 0 7 2.74 2.11 
        
22.00 AMI 160 .00 100.00 6.45 15.23 
Revisit 160 .01 2.51 .75 .53 
Acute 156 .00 3.67 1.24 .97 
ER48 156 .00 23.03 2.53 4.99 
ER3 156 .00 5.62 1.64 1.04 
ER1 156 .00 1.29 .29 .27 
Antibio3 156 .00 90.95 22.68 22.02 
Acutebeds 160 27 1833 457.42 474.70 
Acuteocuppy 116 14.58 93.87 66.43 15.97 
NoCompetitor 160 0 13 4.41 3.18 
        
33.00 AMI 96 .00 66.67 10.79 16.54 
 
Revisit 96 .04 2.64 .90 .50 
 
Acute 96 .04 3.27 1.00 .64 
 
ER48 96 .00 5.96 .38 1.10 
 
ER3 96 .00 5.96 1.09 1.39 
 
ER1 96 .00 3.74 .92 .90 
 
Antibio3 96 .00 75.59 19.30 19.90 
 
Acutebeds 96 61 1308 407.27 304.01 
 
Acuteocuppy 72 35.42 90.42 60.75 14.69 
 
NoCompetitor 96 0 10 3.10 2.89 
& 11 = hospitals located in the Northern region; 22 = hospitals in Southern region; 33 = hospitals in 
Central Taiwan 
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* Number needs to be divided by 4 because the data contains a period of 4 years. Odd numbers are due 
to missing values 
 = The number of hospitals in the market 
♠ = The number of acute beds in a hospital 
╬ = The occupancy rate of acute beds in a hospital 
 
† = Emergency department visit rate for Acute Myocardial Infarction (AMI) patients who returned 
to the hospital within 3 days after discharge 
◊ = Rate for outpatients revisiting the same hospital the same day after being treated for the same 
disease 
% = The percentage of patients staying in acute beds for more than 30 days 
¶ = Percentage of patients staying in emergency room (ER) for more than 48 hours before being 
admitted  
# = Percentage of ER visits of patients who return to the hospital after 3 days of discharge 
☼ = Percentage of patients returning to ER the same day after being treated in the ER  








Table 4.6 Association between hospitals and quality of care: based on levels, 
ownership, merged/non-merged, or locations 
Quality 
Indicator 
Hospital variable§ F Statistics P Value Post Hoc Analysis 
AMI† Type 3 3.625 0.027 Regional > Medical CTR 
 Public 5.922 0.015 Public > Private 
 Hosp2 2.715 0.100   
  Area 3 4.095 0.017 Central > Northern region 
     
Revisit◊ Type 3 12.928 0.000 Medical CTR > Regional 
  Public 0.021 0.885   
 Hosp2 1.504 0.221   
 Area 3 4.095 0.017 Central > Northern 
     
Acute% Type3 8.092 0.000 Medical CTR > Regional 
 Public 11.270 0.001 Public > Private 
 Hosp2 0.139 0.709   
 Area3 4.807 0.009 Northern > Central 
     
ER48¶ Type3 38.892 0.000 Medical CTR > Regional  
 Public 0.284 0.595   
 Hosp2 0.007 0.934   
 Area 3 2.417 0.090   
     
ER3# Type 3 7.898 0.000 Medical CTR >Regional 
 Public 0.133 0.715   
 Hosp2 0.060 0.807  
 Area 3 25.831 0.000 Northern > Southern 
     
ER1☼ Type 3 0.067 0.936  
 Public 1.706 0.192  
 Hosp2 1.260 0.262  
 Area 3 11.921 0.000 Central > Northern 
     
Antibio3‡ Type 3 1.200 0.302  
 Public 0.058 0.810  
 Hosp2 0.024 0.876  
 Area 3 0.427 0.653  
† = Emergency department visit rate for Acute Myocardial Infarction (AMI) patients who returned 
to the hospital within 3 days after discharge 
◊ = Rate for outpatients revisiting the same hospital the same day after being treated for the same 
disease 
% = The percentage of patients staying in acute beds for more than 30 days 
¶ = Percentage of patients staying in emergency room (ER) for more than 48 hours before being 
admitted  
# = Percentage of ER visits of patients who return to the hospital after 3 days of discharge 
☼ = Percentage of patients returning to ER the same day after being treated in the ER  
‡ = Percentage of patients receiving antibiotic treatment for more than 3 days after debridement 
 
§ Type 3 = medical Center, regional hospitals, district hospitals; Public = public vs. private 
hospitals; Hosp2 = merged vs. non-merged hospitals; Area 3 = Northern, Central, and 




Table 4.7 ~ Table 4.13 Association between acute bed size, number of hospitals in 
the same area and quality for public (1) and private (0) hospitals  
 
 
Emergency department visit rate for Acute Myocardial Infarction (AMI) 
patients who returned to the hospital within 3 days after discharge 
Public Parameter Estimate 
Std. 
Error df t Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
0 Intercept -1.402243 .439983 91.561 -3.187 .002 -2.276144 -.528343 
NoCompetitor -.099090 .081986 92.645 -1.209 .230 -.261906 .063727 
Acutebeds .001653 .000591 90.471 2.799 .006 .000480 .002827 
         
1 Intercept -.169848 .645970 40.568 -.263 .794 -1.474833 1.135136 
NoCompetitor .076807 .126260 40.491 .608 .546 -.178278 .331892 




Rate for outpatients revisiting the same hospital the same day after being 
treated for the same disease 
Public Parameter Estimate 
Std. 
Error df t Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
0 Intercept -.785098 .123225 79.913 -6.371 .000 -1.030327 -.539869 
Acutebeds .001001 .000167 79.147 5.993 .000 .000668 .001333 
NoCompetitor -.020141 .021923 97.619 -.919 .361 -.063647 .023366 






37.151 2.729 .010 6.725104E-5 .000455 
 
NoCompetitor 








The percentage of patients staying in acute beds for more than 30 days 
Public Parameter Estimate 
Std. 
Error df t Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
0 Intercept -.986815 .196275 73.300 -5.028 .000 -1.377963 -.595667 
Acutebeds .001427 .000265 72.296 5.374 .000 .000898 .001956 
NoCompetitor .007432 .036180 77.243 .205 .838 -.064609 .079472 
1 Intercept .148615 .155129 41.877 .958 .344 -.164474 .461705 
Acutebeds .000394 .000116 39.633 3.394 .002 .000159 .000629 
NoCompetitor -.001949 .030072 44.284 -.065 .949 -.062545 .058646 
 
Percentage of patients staying in emergency room (ER) for more than 48 hours 
before being admitted 
Public Parameter Estimate 
Std. 
Error df t Sig. 





0 Intercept -3.774927 .350781 81.604 -10.762 .000 -4.472792 -3.077062 
Acutebeds .003802 .000474 80.529 8.014 .000 .002858 .004746 
NoCompetitor -.038069 .064670 85.759 -.589 .558 -.166635 .090497 
1 Intercept -2.577375 .636074 41.138 -4.052 .000 -3.861822 -1.292928 
Acutebeds .001971 .000481 37.392 4.094 .000 .000996 .002946 










Error df t Sig. 





0 Intercept -.843337 .334913 78.789 -2.518 .014 -1.509993 -.176682 
Acutebeds .001547 .000454 77.958 3.406 .001 .000643 .002452 
NoCompetit
or 
-.014543 .060604 89.292 -.240 .811 -.134956 .105869 
1 Intercept -.426902 .420178 47.425 -1.016 .315 -1.271990 .418187 
 
Acutebeds 




.136729 .076871 65.061 1.779 .080 -.016791 .290249 
 
 
  Percentage of patients returning to ER the same day after being treated in 
the ER 
Public Parameter Estimate 
Std. 
Error df t Sig. 





0 Intercept -1.502234 .262481 78.541 -5.723 .000 -2.024738 -.979731 
Acutebeds .000510 .000356 77.731 1.432 .156 -.000199 .001219 
NoCompetit
or 
-.043596 .047442 89.443 -.919 .361 -.137856 .050663 
1 Intercept -.602217 .257894 40.526 -2.335 .025 -1.123230 -.081205 
Acutebeds 





-.111176 .050225 41.813 -2.214 .032 -.212549 -.009804 
 




Percentage of patients receiving antibiotic treatment for more than 3 days 
after debridement 
Public Parameter Estimate 
Std. 
Error df t Sig. 





0 Intercept 2.366951 .352088 77.997 6.723 .000 1.665998 3.067904 
Acutebeds .000368 .000475 76.938 .774 .441 -.000579 .001314 
NoCompetit -.117777 .065263 80.273 -1.805 .075 -.247648 .012093 
1 Intercept 1.862885 .528825 36.779 3.523 .001 .791168 2.934603 
Acutebeds .000295 .000394 35.294 .748 .459 -.000505 .001095 





Table 4.14 to Table 4.20  
Association between acute bed size, number of hospitals in the same area and 
quality for merged (1) and non-merged (0) hospitals 
 
Emergency department visit rate for Acute Myocardial Infarction (AMI) 
patients who returned to the hospital within 3 days after discharge 
Hosp2 Parameter Estimate Std. Error df T Sig. 





.00 Intercept -.868222 .378303 131.119 -2.295 .023 -1.616590 -.119855 
NoCompetitor -.032637 .071880 132.067 -.454 .651 -.174821 .109547 
Acutebeds .000604 .000422 129.729 1.432 .154 -.000230 .001439 
1.00 Intercept -.833114 9.296174 8.421 -.090 .931 -22.084827 20.418599 
NoCompetitor -.664516 2.084083 8.456 -.319 .758 -5.425651 4.096620 
Acutebeds .001098 .002647 8.098 .415 .689 -.004994 .007190 
 
 
Rate for outpatients revisiting the same hospital the same day after being treated 
for the same disease 
Hosp2 Parameter Estimate Std. Error df t Sig. 





.00 Intercept -.640030 .094205 118.007 -6.794 .000 -.826581 -.453479 
Acutebeds .000734 .000107 111.372 6.855 .000 .000522 .000947 
NoCompetitor -.024911 .017075 146.680 -1.459 .147 -.058655 .008833 
1.00 Intercept -.097748 1.219564 11.919 -.080 .937 -2.756949 2.561453 
Acutebeds -.000147 .000346 11.658 -.426 .678 -.000903 .000609 
NoCompetitor -.108342 .273549 11.938 -.396 .699 -.704697 .488013 
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The percentage of patients staying in acute beds for more than 30 days 







.00 Intercept -.621900 .156968 108.057 -3.962 .000 -.933035 -.310764 
Acutebeds .001023 .000177 105.317 5.794 .000 .000673 .001373 
NoCompetitor .005219 .029513 114.605 .177 .860 -.053243 .063681 
1.00 Intercept -.626451 1.671898 11.361 -.375 .715 -4.292047 3.039146 
Acutebeds .000520 .000488 11.888 1.064 .309 -.000546 .001585 
NoCompetitor .063764 .373581 11.258 .171 .868 -.756188 .883717 
 
Percentage of patients staying in emergency room (ER) for more than 48 hours 
before being admitted 







.00 Intercept -3.389212 .314016 115.839 -10.793 .000 -4.011170 -2.767254 
Acutebeds .003203 .000353 112.850 9.066 .000 .002503 .003903 
NoCompetitor -.059784 .058981 123.228 -1.014 .313 -.176531 .056963 
1.00 Intercept -1.963176 3.581190 11.183 -.548 .594 -9.829655 5.903302 
Acutebeds .000701 .001042 11.878 .673 .514 -.001572 .002973 
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Percentage of ER visits of patients who return to the hospital after 3 days of 
discharge 







.00 Intercept -.663132 .278060 115.578 -2.385 .019 -1.213886 -.112379 
Acutebeds .000933 .000315 110.436 2.959 .004 .000308 .001558 
NoCompetitor .034823 .051102 135.119 .681 .497 -.066239 .135885 
1.00 Intercept .434998 .449661 11.966 .967 .352 -.545043 1.415038 
Acutebeds 




NoCompetitor .018115 .100754 11.951 .180 .860 -.201510 .237740 
 
Percentage of patients returning to ER the same day after being treated in the 
ER 
Hosp2 Parameter Estimate Std. Error df t Sig. 





.00 Intercept -1.152634 .202025 114.412 -5.705 .000 -1.552828 -.752439 
Acutebeds -5.814223E-5 .000228 110.449 -.255 .799 -.000510 .000394 
NoCompetitor -.058868 .037602 126.725 -1.566 .120 -.133277 .015540 
1.00 Intercept -.923241 1.671050 10.020 -.552 .593 -4.645579 2.799097 
Acutebeds .000257 .000516 11.765 .499 .627 -.000869 .001384 
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Percentage of patients receiving antibiotic treatment for more than 3 days after 
debridement 
Hosp2 Parameter Estimate Std. Error df t Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
.00 Intercept 2.216668 .296544 110.262 7.475 .000 1.629003 2.804334 
Acutebeds .000340 .000332 108.338 1.023 .309 -.000319 .000999 
NoCompetitor -.071784 .056114 113.366 -1.279 .203 -.182952 .039384 
1.00 Intercept 3.383295 1.116780 11.629 3.030 .011 .941410 5.825180 
Acutebeds -.000234 .000326 11.940 -.717 .487 -.000943 .000476 





Table 4.21 to Table 4.27  
Association between acute bed size, number of hospitals in the same area and 
quality for hospital levels (1= medical centers, 2 = regional hospitals, 3= district 
hospitals) 
Emergency department visit rate for Acute Myocardial Infarction (AMI) 
patients who returned to the hospital within 3 days after discharge 
Type3 Parameter Estimate Std. Error df t Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1.00 Intercept -1.502103 .925499 14.961 -1.623 .125 -3.475210 .471004 
NoCompetitor .150228 .107105 15.817 1.403 .180 -.077038 .377493 
Acutebeds .000132 .000573 14.937 .231 .821 -.001090 .001354 
2.00 Intercept -.265068 .598207 48.554 -.443 .660 -1.467490 .937355 
NoCompetitor -.063364 .088569 49.622 -.715 .478 -.241293 .114565 
Acutebeds .000833 .000648 48.149 1.285 .205 -.000470 .002137 
3.00 Intercept -1.163298 .751876 63.481 -1.547 .127 -2.665579 .338984 
NoCompetitor -.094138 .143103 63.264 -.658 .513 -.380084 .191807 
Acutebeds .000580 .002420 62.564 .240 .811 -.004257 .005417 
 
Rate for outpatients revisiting the same hospital the same day after being treated 
for the same disease 
Type3 Parameter Estimate Std. Error df t Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1.00 Intercept -.143182 .186252 16.469 -.769 .453 -.537107 .250743 
Acutebeds .000218 .000113 18.043 1.930 .069 -1.923956E-5 .000455 
NoCompetitor .004570 .019010 25.543 .240 .812 -.034540 .043680 
2.00 Intercept -.105778 .131708 59.662 -.803 .425 -.369263 .157707 
Acutebeds 3.025309
E-5 
.000145 56.920 .209 .835 -.000260 .000321 
NoCompetitor -.015957 .018890 67.013 -.845 .401 -.053663 .021748 
3.00 Intercept -.928413 .171849 59.384 -5.402 .000 -1.272237 -.584590 
Acutebeds .001967 .000558 58.407 3.524 .001 .000850 .003085 
NoCompetitor -.041777 .032486 61.992 -1.286 .203 -.106716 .023161 
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The percentage of patients staying in acute beds for more than 30 days 
Type3 Parameter Estimate Std. Error df t Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1.00 Intercept .327813 .167683 16.933 1.955 .067 -.026076 .681701 
Acutebeds .000360 .000103 17.453 3.487 .003 .000143 .000578 
NoCompetitor -.023215 .018549 20.193 -1.252 .225 -.061883 .015453 
2.00 Intercept -.229471 .181188 54.606 -1.266 .211 -.592638 .133696 
Acutebeds .000496 .000199 52.405 2.498 .016 9.774531E-5 .000895 
NoCompetitor .017398 .026195 59.587 .664 .509 -.035007 .069804 
3.00 Intercept -1.094775 .324645 53.146 -3.372 .001 -1.745889 -.443662 
Acutebeds .003043 .001053 52.423 2.889 .006 .000930 .005156 
NoCompetitor .003304 .061785 53.643 .053 .958 -.120586 .127194 
 
Percentage of patients staying in emergency room (ER) for more than 48 hours 
before being admitted 
Type3 Parameter Estimate Std. Error df t Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1.00 Intercept .941577 .905625 16.428 1.040 .314 -.974207 2.857362 
Acutebeds .000528 .000552 17.736 .958 .351 -.000632 .001688 
NoCompetit
or 
-.017095 .094347 23.853 -.181 .858 -.211881 .177690 
2.00 Intercept -1.875139 .557497 50.548 -3.363 .001 -2.994605 -.755674 
Acutebeds .000746 .000607 49.452 1.229 .225 -.000474 .001966 
NoCompetit
or 
-.130531 .081717 52.727 -1.597 .116 -.294454 .033391 
3.00 Intercept -3.933512 .499853 57.565 -7.869 .000 -4.934236 -2.932787 
Acutebeds .004780 .001622 56.808 2.948 .005 .001532 .008027 
NoCompetit
or 
-.043683 .095133 58.072 -.459 .648 -.234107 .146741 
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Percentage of ER visits of patients who return to the hospital after 3 days of 
discharge 
Type
3 Parameter Estimate Std. Error df t Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower 
Bound Upper Bound 





15.877 -1.940 .070 -.000371 1.657328E-5 
NoCompetitor .024330 .016387 18.490 1.485 .154 -.010032 .058691 
2.00 Intercept .249134 .388272 54.237 .642 .524 -.529226 1.027494 
Acutebeds .000378 .000425 52.309 .889 .378 -.000475 .001231 
NoCompetitor -.019387 .056351 58.319 -.344 .732 -.132172 .093399 
3.00 Intercept -1.114538 .558320 59.698 -1.996 .050 -2.231460 .002384 
Acutebeds .000898 .001819 58.882 .494 .623 -.002741 .004538 
NoCompetitor .064466 .105550 62.425 .611 .544 -.146496 .275429 
 
Percentage of patients returning to ER the same day after being treated in the 
ER 
Type
3 Parameter Estimate Std. Error df t Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower 
Bound Upper Bound 
1.00 Intercept -.472980 .672669 17.342 -.703 .491 -1.890058 .944098 
Acutebeds -.000679 .000408 18.953 -1.665 .112 -.001533 .000175 
NoCompetitor -.009558 .068706 26.543 -.139 .890 -.150645 .131530 
2.00 Intercept -1.374983 .329581 53.793 -4.172 .000 -2.035812 -.714154 
Acutebeds .000412 .000361 51.684 1.141 .259 -.000313 .001137 
NoCompetitor -.029565 .047702 58.475 -.620 .538 -.125034 .065905 
3.00 Intercept -.989104 .367961 57.051 -2.688 .009 -1.725918 -.252291 
Acutebeds -.000144 .001196 56.249 -.121 .904 -.002540 .002251 









Percentage of patients receiving antibiotic treatment for more than 3 days after 
debridement 
Type
3 Parameter Estimate Std. Error df t Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1.00 Intercept 1.482096 .238958 19.591 6.202 .000 .982970 1.981222 
Acutebeds .000395 .000148 19.609 2.670 .015 8.605532E-5 .000704 
NoCompetitor -.025745 .027513 20.871 -.936 .360 -.082984 .031494 
2.00 Intercept 2.774636 .289582 43.788 9.582 .000 2.190942 3.358330 
Acutebeds -.000249 .000315 43.111 -.791 .433 -.000883 .000386 
NoCompetitor .001313 .042650 45.245 .031 .976 -.084575 .087201 
3.00 Intercept 1.715919 .654269 53.160 2.623 .011 .403713 3.028124 
Acutebeds .003607 .002120 52.436 1.702 .095 -.000646 .007860 





Table 4.28 to Table 4.34  
Association between acute bed size, number of hospitals in the same area and 
quality for hospital location (11= northern Taiwan, 22 = southern Taiwan, 3= 
central Taiwan) 
Emergency department visit rate for Acute Myocardial Infarction (AMI) 
patients who returned to the hospital within 3 days after discharge 
area3 Parameter Estimate Std. Error df T Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
11.00 Intercept -.209253 .576317 51.421 -.363 .718 -1.366028 .947521 
NoCompetitor -.071023 .145908 51.835 -.487 .628 -.363831 .221784 
Acutebeds .000216 .000462 50.466 .468 .642 -.000712 .001145 
22.00 Intercept -2.327640 .611350 51.030 -3.807 .000 -3.554959 -1.100321 
NoCompetitor .050041 .096922 51.046 .516 .608 -.144532 .244615 
Acutebeds .001441 .000652 50.526 2.211 .032 .000132 .002750 
33.00 Intercept -.727856 .883970 27.361 -.823 .417 -2.540494 1.084781 
NoCompetitor .002608 .162257 28.389 .016 .987 -.329556 .334772 
Acutebeds .001140 .001560 27.295 .730 .471 -.002060 .004340 
 
Rate for outpatients revisiting the same hospital the same day after being treated 
for the same disease 
area3 Parameter Estimate Std. Error df t Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
11.00 Intercept -.571055 .128777 51.335 -4.434 .000 -.829545 -.312566 
Acutebeds .000356 .000108 44.016 3.303 .002 .000139 .000572 
NoCompetitor .016395 .031411 61.613 .522 .604 -.046401 .079192 
22.00 Intercept -.904527 .186408 45.622 -4.852 .000 -1.279831 -.529224 
Acutebeds .000895 .000203 42.429 4.407 .000 .000486 .001305 
NoCompetitor -.006536 .028643 53.262 -.228 .820 -.063980 .050908 
33.00 Intercept -.504399 .168102 29.206 -3.001 .005 -.848100 -.160697 
Acutebeds .001102 .000279 38.496 3.944 .000 .000537 .001667 








The percentage of patients staying in acute beds for more than 30 days 
area3 Parameter Estimate Std. Error df t Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
11.00 Intercept -.099995 .165848 47.235 -.603 .549 -.433595 .233605 
Acutebeds .000527 .000133 45.848 3.951 .000 .000259 .000796 
NoCompetitor .011915 .041924 48.097 .284 .777 -.072374 .096204 
22.00 Intercept -1.410490 .321480 40.857 -4.387 .000 -2.059802 -.761179 
Acutebeds .001599 .000346 39.429 4.616 .000 .000899 .002300 
NoCompetitor .066159 .050073 43.282 1.321 .193 -.034804 .167122 
33.00 Intercept -.429632 .264816 26.967 -1.622 .116 -.973020 .113756 
Acutebeds .000630 .000463 29.029 1.361 .184 -.000317 .001576 
NoCompetitor -.023695 .047296 30.400 -.501 .620 -.120232 .072843 
 
Percentage of patients staying in emergency room (ER) for more than 48 hours 
before being admitted 
area3 Parameter Estimate Std. Error df t Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
11.00 Intercept -2.412576 .576892 48.380 -4.182 .000 -3.572258 -1.252893 
Acutebeds .001986 .000473 44.113 4.201 .000 .001033 .002939 
NoCompetitor -.125083 .143644 52.981 -.871 .388 -.413199 .163034 
22.00 Intercept -3.503613 .470738 45.537 -7.443 .000 -4.451420 -2.555807 
Acutebeds .004060 .000506 44.390 8.028 .000 .003041 .005079 
NoCompetitor -.073655 .073657 47.064 -1.000 .322 -.221828 .074517 
33.00 Intercept -4.145016 .500032 27.242 -8.290 .000 -5.170569 -3.119463 
Acutebeds .002431 .000881 27.920 2.759 .010 .000626 .004235 
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Percentage of ER visits of patients who return to the hospital after 3 days of 
discharge 
area3 Parameter Estimate Std. Error df t Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
11.00 Intercept .690973 .155053 59.658 4.456 .000 .380785 1.001162 
Acutebeds .000158 .000125 57.781 1.262 .212 -9.240827E-5 .000408 
NoCompetitor -.023413 .039153 60.956 -.598 .552 -.101705 .054878 
22.00 Intercept -.302898 .298336 41.217 -1.015 .316 -.905304 .299509 
Acutebeds .000720 .000322 39.778 2.239 .031 6.999630E-5 .001370 
NoCompetitor .025565 .046467 43.660 .550 .585 -.068104 .119234 
33.00 Intercept -3.850845 .711602 26.623 -5.412 .000 -5.311902 -2.389788 
Acutebeds .004082 .001230 30.152 3.318 .002 .001570 .006594 
NoCompetitor .120830 .125102 31.668 .966 .341 -.134100 .375759 
 
Percentage of patients returning to ER the same day after being treated in the 
ER 
area3 Parameter Estimate Std. Error df t Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
11.00 Intercept -1.286007 .287794 49.473 -4.469 .000 -1.864210 -.707804 
Acutebeds -.000128 .000235 45.892 -.547 .587 -.000601 .000344 
NoCompetitor -.064530 .071983 53.022 -.896 .374 -.208907 .079848 
22.00 Intercept -1.804828 .342479 43.163 -5.270 .000 -2.495426 -1.114229 
Acutebeds .000529 .000370 41.371 1.429 .161 -.000218 .001276 
NoCompetitor -.036337 .053112 46.618 -.684 .497 -.143207 .070533 
33.00 Intercept -.546973 .306417 27.055 -1.785 .085 -1.175629 .081682 
Acutebeds .000619 .000534 29.407 1.158 .256 -.000473 .001711 
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Percentage of patients receiving antibiotic treatment for more than 3 days after 
debridement 
area3 Parameter Estimate Std. Error df t Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
11.00 Intercept 2.170912 .437144 43.956 4.966 .000 1.289881 3.051943 
Acutebeds .000240 .000354 41.640 .676 .503 -.000475 .000954 
NoCompetitor -.011656 .109979 45.928 -.106 .916 -.233040 .209729 
22.00 Intercept 2.137480 .545025 41.711 3.922 .000 1.037349 3.237612 
Acutebeds .000216 .000584 40.909 .371 .713 -.000963 .001396 
NoCompetitor -.024086 .085528 42.447 -.282 .780 -.196635 .148462 
33.00 Intercept 2.215747 .598343 28.787 3.703 .001 .991603 3.439890 
Acutebeds .001042 .001056 28.942 .987 .332 -.001118 .003202 













EFFECTS OF HOSPITAL MERGER, OWNERSHIP, LEVEL, AND 
LOCATION ON HOSPTIAL COSTS: EVIDENCE FROM TAIWAN 
 
Abstract 
Background: In recent years, the NHI has implemented various measures to contain 
costs such as reducing drug prices, establishing a sliding scale of outpatient payments 
when providers exceed a specified number of patients seen, eliminating subsidies, and 
implementing DRG system (Cheng, March 2015). However, the long-term 
sustainability of the NHI is questionable as Taiwan is now facing a growing aging 
population and decreasing family size (Liu and Shen, 2015). Thus, finding out the 
potential factors that may influence hospital costs and derive policy attention to 
address the issues driving-up hospital costs may contribute to the long-term survival 
of the program. As such, this study aims: 1) To identify the factors that may affect 
hospital costs; 2) To add to the existing limited literature on the association of hospital 
factors with hospital costs.  
Methods: The study includes hospital level data from 2012 to 2014 compiled by the 
Ministry of Health and Welfare. The data contains a total number of 106 hospitals that 
are located in northern, central, and southern Taiwan. The study employs the General 
Linear Mixed Model (GLMM) to examine the relationship between hospital costs and 
hospital factors in terms of time, merger, ownership, location, occupancy rate, the 
EFFECTS OF MERGERS AND HOSPITAL FACTORS ON HOSPTIAL COSTS AND QUALITY  
111 
 
number of acute beds, and the number of competitors. The main dependent variable is 
the total hospital operating costs.  
Results: The results indicate that the number of acute beds, the occupancy rate of 
acute beds, and year are significantly associated with hospital costs (P < 0.05). 
However, the number of competitors, merged/non-merged hospitals, ownership, and 
location are insignificantly associated with hospital costs (P > 0.05).  
Conclusions: Findings in this study may imply that hospital costs could be influenced 
by public policies and practices. However, further investigation based on a larger 
sample of hospitals with a longer period of time is important. This would support the 




Introduction and Background   
The implementation of the National Health Insurance (NHI) program in 1995 
and the practice of the global budget system that caps total NHI expenses in 2002 
have combined to put unprecedented pressure on Taiwan’s hospitals. Many have 
sought ways to manage costs while maintaining a high quality of care. Such pressure 
has forced many small hospitals to exit the market and the remaining hospitals to 
become bigger in size (Lin, 2012). This has also led the government to implement the 
third healthcare reform – the three mergers formed by several city hospitals: a merger 
of 10 city hospitals located in Taipei City in 2005, a merger of two city hospitals in 
New Taipei City in 2004, and merger of two city hospitals in Kaohsiung City in 2002.  
Moreover, it has been 21 years since Taiwan implemented the NHI system. The NHI 
has been seeking ways to contain its costs as it has suffered financial deficit since its 
implementation. It was only with the introduction of the second increase in the 
premium rate in 2010 and the inclusion of non-payroll income as new sources of 
premiums (i.e. the second generation NHI) in 2013, that the NHI finally overturned its 
deficits to surpluses (Lu et al., 2016; Chang, May 2015). In recent years, the NHI has 
implemented various measures to contain costs such as reducing drug prices, 
establishing a sliding scale of outpatient payments when providers exceed a specified 
number of patients seen, eliminating subsidies, and implementing DRG system 
(Cheng, March 2015). However, the long-term sustainability of the NHI is 
questionable as Taiwan is now facing a growing aging population and decreasing 
family sizes (Liu and Shen, 2015). Thus, finding out the potential factors that may 
influence hospital costs and derive policy attention to address the issues driving up 
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hospital costs may contribute to the long-term survival of the program. As such, this 
study aims: 1) To identify the factors that may affect hospital costs; 2) To add to the 
existing limited literature on the association of hospital factors with hospital costs.  
Besides hospital merger or competition, empirical research also demonstrates 
other factors such as ownership, hospital levels, hospital and number of beds that may 
influence hospital costs (Chang et al., 2004; Hung and Chang, 2008). In the U.S., 
research examining factors influencing hospital costs such as the effects of hospital 
competition, mergers, and ownership demonstrates mixed results. However, in Taiwan, 
research pertaining to the factors that affect hospital costs is limited. This may due to 
the limited access to hospital and patient level data. Furthermore, the cost savings in 
this study refer to the savings or reduction in costs to the hospital, not to the 
consumers. Ownership refers to either private or public owned. Hospital level 
includes medical center, regional hospitals, and district hospitals. This chapter is 
organized as follows: literature review, methods, results, discussion, and conclusion.  
 
Literature review 
Literature on cost savings associated with hospital merger 
Similar to the results of empirical studies on the impact of competition associated 
with quality of care, findings of empirical research on the effects of hospital mergers 
associated with hospital costs are also inconclusive. Based on the author’s research, 
there is no research on hospital mergers in Taiwan published in the U.S. or U.K. 
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However, there is one dissertation written in Chinese that focuses on merger effects 
associated with costs in Taiwan (Wang, 2008). Wang (2008) applies linear regression 
to examine the association among the salary expenses, non-medical supply expenses, 
medical supply expenses, and total operating costs of the Taipei City Hospital. Wang’s 
(2008) findings suggest that the hospital’s total operating costs are significantly 
associated with the medical supply expenses. Moreover, Wang (2008) also applies 
student’s t statistics to examine the changes in total operating costs before and after 
the merger. Her findings indicate that the hospital’s total operating costs reduced 
significantly after the merger.  
In the U.S., there are various studies that evaluate cost reduction associated with 
hospital mergers. (Alexander et al., 1996; Connor et al., 1997; Dranove, 2003; Spang 
et al., 2001; Kusserow, 1992). Some researchers have even found that the cost savings 
produced by hospital mergers can be significant (Vogt & Town, 2008). The U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services (Kusserow, 1992) examines the 
percentage change in total operating costs, revenues, and patient volume of two 
groups of merged and non-merged hospitals that are geographically similar. The two 
groups of merged and non-merged hospitals include a random selection of eleven 
hospital mergers from the American Hospital Association (AHA) list in 1987 and a 
control group of hospitals with similar geographic characteristics (Ibid). The author 
applies the Wilcoxon Rank Sum and Median tests to compare the two groups and 
concludes that while the merged hospitals generate cost savings, they are indifferent 
in terms of growth in revenues and patient volume (P.1, Ibid).  
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The longitudinal study done by Alexander et al. (1996) also reports reduced costs. 
Alexander et al. (1996) apply a multiple time-series design with a longitudinal 
assessment of changes in scale of activity, staffing practices, and operating 
efficiencies before and after the merger (1996). The authors identify 92 mergers that 
took place between 1982 and 1989 from the AHA Annual Survey of Hospitals. They 
find that hospital mergers lead to improved operating efficiency as increases in the 
ratio of total expenses per adjusted admission for non-merging hospitals are larger 
than those of the merging groups. Furthermore, the decline of occupancy rate is 
significantly less for the merging hospitals than those of the non-merging hospitals 
(Ibid). However, Alexander et al. (1996) find that utilizing a control group of 
non-merging hospitals that are randomly drawn may inadequately account for 
systematic effects such as high penetration of managed care and the status of the 
hospitals (Capps, 2005).    
Connor et al. (1997) apply a multivariate analysis in their longitudinal study to 
examine 122 hospital mergers listed in the AHA Annual Survey and analyze changes 
in hospital costs and prices before and after mergers from 1986 to 1994. The 
researchers compare the costs and prices of merged hospitals to those of the control 
group consisting of 3,500 non-merged hospitals. The researchers report that the 
growth in operating costs and prices of all merging hospitals are 7.2 and 7.1 
percentage points, respectively. This is lower than those of non-merging hospitals 
(Conner et al., 1997; Spang et al., 2001). Their research provides evidence that 
horizontal hospital mergers lead to savings in annual operating expenses and such 
savings lead to lower prices for consumers (Connor et al., 1997). In their subsequent 
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research (1998), they apply a multivariate analysis to investigate operating costs and 
prices associated with hospital mergers in relation to market concentration (Connor et 
al., 1998). Connor et al. (1998) also find cost savings associated with hospital mergers 
and conclude that horizontal hospital mergers generate an average cost savings of 5% 
(1998). Moreover, the authors indicate that these cost savings are greater for mergers 
of similar-size hospitals but the cost savings are not as pronounced in more 
concentrated markets (Connor et al., 1998; Ho and Hamilton, 2000).    
Spang et al. (2001) update and expand the work of Connor et al. (1997) to 
examine the changes of total hospital costs and prices for merging and non-merging 
hospitals from the AHA Annual Survey from 1989 to 1997 (2001). However, unlike 
the study of Connor et al. (1997), Spang et al. (2001) divide the non-merging 
hospitals into two groups: non-merging rival hospitals and non-merging non-rival 
hospitals. According to the researchers (2001), this allows them to examine the 
merger effects more clearly by comparing merging hospitals with their rivals that are 
located in the same market and encounter similar conditions (Spang et al., 2001). 
Similar to the findings of Connor et al. (1997, 1998), the findings of Spang et al. 
(2001) indicate that both the growth of costs and prices for merging hospitals are 
lower (10 and 7.9 percentage points respectively) than those of non-merging hospitals 
(Ibid). Moreover, Spang et al. (2001) find that in more competitive markets, 
merger-related cost and price savings are larger when merging hospitals are compared 
with their non-merging non-rivals but are smaller when compared with their 
non-merging rivals (2001). Furthermore, Spang et al. (2009) conduct a multivariate 
analysis to examine the direct effects of mergers on total costs and prices of 4,140 
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urban hospitals which consist of 125 mergers, 1040 system acquisitions, and 2995 
non-merging hospitals in the AHA Annual Survey from 1988 to 1997 (2009). Spang et 
al. (2009) find that merging hospitals in general have higher costs and prices than 
average hospitals before the merger and suggest that such results may be their 
rationale for merging (2009). However, the researchers conclude that the cost savings 
and lower prices that result from mergers are only exhibited among for-profit 
hospitals in highly competitive markets (2009).  
Dranove (1998) applies semiparametric methods to examine the efficiency gains 
of fourteen non-revenue producing cost centers for merging hospitals. Dranove (1998) 
indicates that small hospitals with approximately 100 beds are more likely than larger 
merging hospitals to obtain significant benefits from economies of scale in 
non-revenue producing cost centers. Furthermore, even if one of the merging 
hospitals is small, nominal rises in price or cost margins may outweigh the gains in 
efficiency (1998). Moreover, the type of mergers such as system mergers may 
influence the effects of hospital mergers associated with costs. The following studies 
illustrate this aspect.  
Dranove and Lindrooth (2003) build on prior studies such as Dranove et al. 
(1995, 1996), and Connor et al. (1997, 1998) to examine whether hospital mergers 
result in cost savings by analyzing changes of system consolidation and mergers. 
They use parametric difference-in-difference (DID) approach to examine the factors 
that impact costs (Dranove and Lindrooth, 2003). The researchers compare 122 
merging hospitals from the AHA Annual Survey to a sample of 10 
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pseudo-consolidations of non-merging hospitals with the same characteristics during 
1988 and 1996 (2003). Dranove and Lindrooth (2003) conclude that while system 
consolidations do not result in cost savings, mergers on average lead to significant 
cost savings of 14% which can persist even two, three and four years after the merger. 
Moreover, Dranove and Lindrooth (2003) point out that capacity reduction may be the 
reason for the cost savings. 
Burns et al. (2015) also examine the effects of system mergers on hospital 
operating costs. The authors analyze 4,000 hospitals located in the fifty states from 
the AHA Annual Survey from 1998 to 2010. They also use the data from the Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), the Area Resource File (ARF) and 
Healthcare Cost Report Information System (HCRIS) (Burns et al., 2015). Burns et al. 
(2015) apply the DID analysis to examine whether system hospitals result in lower 
operating costs over time. They also analyze the association between system size and 
hospital operating costs. Burns et al. (2015) conclude that system hospitals do not 
result in lower operating costs and larger hospital systems (i.e. with more than 30 or 
more hospitals) generate significantly higher average operating costs than all other 
hospitals. Moreover, Burns et al. (2015) indicate that the lack of capabilities to 
centralize governance and develop shared services organizations that can generate 
cost savings may be one of the reasons for the failure of multihospital systems to 
reduce operating costs.  
Harrison (2011) provides a different view from the studies mentioned above. She 
identifies a total of 104 mergers from the AHA Survey of Hospitals from 1984 to 
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1998 to examine whether the merging hospitals obtain economies of scale by 
comparing their potential post-merger cost savings 3 years post-merger with their 
realized cost savings over the period and during the first, second, and third year after 
the merger (Harrison, 2011). Harrison (2011) points out that the cost savings for the 
merging hospitals in the year after the merger are the largest but they decrease in 
subsequent years after the merger (Ibid). 
As illustrated in some studies, system mergers or mergers may influence hospital 
costs. However, the findings of most of the studies in general conclude that hospital 
mergers lead to the potential benefits such as cost and price savings and enhanced 
efficiency, although the cost savings may decline overtime.  
 
Literature on the association of hospital ownership, level on hospital costs 
 Chang et al., (2004) investigate the association between hospital ownership and 
operating efficiency by using the data from the surveys of hospitals compiled by the 
MOHW in both 1996 and 1997. The total number of hospitals in their sample includes 
43 regional and 440 district hospitals in 1996 and 44 regional and 429 district 
hospitals in 1997. They employ an output-based approach which measures the amount 
of output that can be obtained from a given level of input and the BCC model to 
estimate the efficiency indices. Chang et al., (2004) use inputs such as number of beds, 
number of physicians, number of nurses, and number of supporting medical personnel 
and outputs such as number of patient days, number of clinic or outpatient visits, and 
number of patients receiving surgery. Chang et al., (2004) find that public district 
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hospitals employ more inputs and generate more outputs than private district hospitals. 
However, the results are mixed for the regional hospitals. Moreover, change et al., 
(2004) find that private regional and district hospitals are more efficient operationally 
than public regional and district hospitals.    
Hung and Chang (2008) examine the factors associated with the increased 
hospital costs after the implementation of the NHI program by using data from the 
NHI Database and the Taipei Health Information Indices Database from 1990 to 2001. 
Their sample includes 12 regional hospitals located in Taipei City. Hung and Chang 
(2008) find that the costs of all hospitals have significantly increased since the 
implantation of NHI. Moreover, Hung and Chang (2008) point out that the factors that 
cause the costs of all the hospitals in the sample to increase include the increasing 
number of patients aged 65 and above, procurement of new medical technology, 
length of stay, and type of diseases. For future research, Hung and Chang (2008) 
suggest examining the association between hospital factors and costs based on larger 
sample of public hospitals. 
Chiang et al. (2014) investigate the association between hospital factors and 
hospital financial performance, using operating margin and return on fixed assets as 
financial performance indicators and dependent variables. Their sample includes 144 
hospitals, including 10 medical centers, 22 regional hospitals, and 112 district 
hospitals. Of which, there are 67 public hospitals, 49 private hospitals, and 28 
hospitals operated by charitable foundations. Moreover, 50 of the hospitals are located 
in northern Taiwan, 21 in central, and 7 in the eastern Taiwan. They employ one-year 
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hospital level data such as inpatient surgery rate, fixed asset used, average length of 
stay, fixed asset ratio, occupancy rate, and amount of hi-tech equipment purchased. 
Chiang et al. (2014) find no significant association between hospital scale and level 
with the profitability indicators. Moreover, Chiang et al. (2014) find a negative 
correlation between length of stay and operating margin, suggesting that increasing 
the average length of stay can result in increased costs and decreased operating 
margin. Furthermore, Chiang et al. (2014) find that a significant and negative 
association between fixed assets ratio and return on fixed assets. Chiang et al. (2014) 
point out that for each unit increase in investments in fixed assets, a hospital’s return 
is decreased by 3.1%. This result is inconsistent with the general belief that increasing 
investment in fixed assets can increase hospital returns (Chiang et al., 2014). In 
addition, Chiang et al. (2014) does not find a significant association between hospital 
location and profitability.  
 Liu et al. (2014) examine the association between cardiologist service volume, 
hospital level, and percutaneous coronary intervention with hospital costs and acute 
myocardial infarction (AMI) mortality. They use the National Health Insurance 
Research Database to identify 7,267 AMI patients treated in medical centers and 
regional hospitals in Taiwan between the period of 1997 and 2010. Liu et al. (2014) 
find that medical centers or regional hospitals with high volume in cardiologist 
service or percutaneous coronary intervention have low mortality rates. Thus Liu et al. 
(2014) indicate that hospital level is not a factor but rather the service volume is the 
factor that impacts quality and hospital costs. However, Liu et al. (2014) find that a 
higher volume of cardiologist service and number of percutaneous coronary 
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intervention performed are associated with increased hospital costs. Liu et al. (2014) 
illustrate that medical centers with high cardiologist service volume and less 
percutaneous coronary intervention performed are the least cost-effect, resulting in 
higher medical costs and lower reduction in mortality rate. In order to improve quality 
of care and to reduce costs, Liu et al. (2014) suggest that policymakers make careful 
financial considerations before developing the proficiency for percutaneous coronary 
intervention of all hospitals especially medical centers that have higher cardiologist 
service volumes. Furthermore, for future research, Liu et al. (2014) suggest that 





The data used in this study is the same as the one used in the study in Chapter 4. 
Based on the availability of the data compiled by the Ministry of Health and Welfare 
(MOHW), the study includes hospital variables such as merged/non-merged hospitals, 
ownership (i.e. public/private hospitals), the acute bed number, the number of 
hospitals in the same city, location, the average occupancy rate, and time. In addition, 
for measuring the intensity of competition such as HHI, data on hospital discharges is 
unavailable for all hospitals and thus the study only applies the number of hospitals in 
the marketplace to measure density of competition. Because MOHW only starts to 
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compile hospital financial data from 2013, the study includes hospital level data from 
2012 to 2014. The data contains a total number of 106 hospitals that are located in 
northern, central, and southern Taiwan. The northern region includes Taipei City, New 
Taipei City, Keelung City, and Yilan City. The central region includes Taichung City, 
Changhwa City, and Nantou City. The southern region includes Kaohsiung City and 
Pingtung City. These locations are chosen because they have Taiwan’s highest 
populous cities - New Taipei City, Kaohsiung City, Taichung City and Taipei City 
(World Population Review, 2016). Moreover, of the 106 hospitals, there are 15 
medical centers, 43 regional hospitals, and 48 district hospitals. From this group, there 
are 35 public and 71 private hospitals; 42 are located in northern Taiwan, 40 in 
southern Taiwan, and 24 in central Taiwan.  
Statistical analysis 
Statistical analysis is performed using SPSS version 23.0 (SPSS INC., Chicago, 
IL, USA). The study employs the Generalized Linear Mixed Model (GLMM) to 
examine the relationship between hospital costs and hospital factors in terms of time, 
merged/non-merged, ownership, location, the number of competitors, the number of 
acute beds, and occupancy rate of acute beds. The main dependent variable is the total 
hospital operating costs. Because the data on the total operating costs is skewed 
toward larger values, the study uses the Gamma regression which assumes a gamma 
distribution with a log link (Garson, 2013). The covariance structure of First-Order 
Autoregressive (AR1) is applied. AR1 is used to represent certain correlation between 
present and future values and the first-order one indicates that the immediately 
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preceding value has a direct impact on the current value (Campbell, 2006; Moffatt, 
2015). Moreover, the Bonferroni’s method is used for multiple comparisons. It is used 
to avoid the chances of obtaining false-positive results (type I errors) when 
performing multiple pair wise tests on the same data set (Napierala, 2016). 
Significance of association is defined as P < 0.05.  
Subgroups are created and analyzed separately. This is for examining the 
association between the number of acute beds, occupancy rate, the number of 
competitors, time and hospital costs for each group of hospitals. There are four 
subgroups: 1. Merged and non-merged hospitals; 2. Private and public hospitals; 3. 
Medical centers, regional hospitals, and district hospitals; 4. Northern, southern, and 
central Taiwan hospitals. 
 
Results 
Table 5.1 provides summary statistics for the total operating costs in 2012, 2013, 
and 2014. During this period, the (mean) total operating costs depict a rising trend. 
Table 5.2 to Table 5.5 are the summary statistics for the total operating costs from this 
period based on merged/non-merged, hospital ownership, hospital levels, and location. 
Table 5.6 contains the statistical results of the association between hospital costs and 
the number of competitors, the number of acute beds, the occupancy rate of acute 
beds, merger, ownership, location and year. Table 5.7 provides subgroup analysis on 
the association of hospital size, occupancy rate, competition, time and hospital costs 
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based on the four categories: merged/non-merged, hospital ownership, levels, and 
location. Figure 5.1 to 5.4 provide comparisons of total operating costs from 2012 to 
2014 between/among each group of hospitals: merged/non-merged, private/public, 
medical centers/regional hospitals/district hospitals, and northern Taiwan 
hospitals/southern Taiwan hospitals/central Taiwan hospitals.  
 
The association between merged/non-merged hospitals, the number of 
competitors, the number of acute beds, occupancy rate of acute beds, ownership, 
location, time and hospital costs  
Merged and non-merged hospitals are insignificant in the regression results (P > 
0.05). However, non-merged hospitals have insignificantly higher costs than merged 
hospitals. Also, the number of competitors and hospital costs are insignificantly 
positive (P > 0.05). This suggests that the more competitors in the marketplace, the 
higher hospital costs will be. However, the association between the number of acute 
beds and hospital costs is significant and positive (P< 0.05). This suggests that the 
higher the number of the acute beds, the higher the hospital costs. Moreover, the 
association between the occupancy rate of acute beds and hospital costs is 
significantly positive. The result indicates that the higher the occupancy rate, the 
higher the hospital costs. In contrast, hospital ownership is insignificantly associated 
with hospital costs; private hospitals demonstrate insignificant higher costs than 
public hospitals. Hospital location is insignificantly associated with hospital costs. Yet 
hospitals in northern Taiwan depict the highest costs, followed by hospitals in central 
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Taiwan, and then hospitals in southern Taiwan (Figure 5.4). Furthermore, time has 
significantly positive association with hospital costs. This suggests that the total 
operating costs of all the hospitals included have grown throughout these years and 
they are likely to continue to grow as time goes by.  
 
Subgroup analysis: association between the number of acute beds, occupancy 
rate, the number of competitors, time and hospital costs for merged/non-merged 
hospitals, private/public hospitals, medical centers/regional hospitals/district 
hospitals, northern/southern/central Taiwan hospitals 
 
 Researchers illustrate that hospital size measured by the number of beds, 
occupancy rates, and competition, can affect hospital costs (Coyne, 2009; Fard et al., 
2010; Fournier and Mitchell, 1992). Also, research finds that in terms of location, 
although rural hospitals have higher costs resulting from the rise of uncompensated 
care, they are very efficient in balancing their other costs, so that their financial 
performance is equivalent to that of urban hospitals (Schumann, 2008). Based on the 
findings from the literature, the study performs subgroup analysis to examine the 
association between the variables such as number of acute beds, occupancy rate, thee 
number of competitors, time, and hospital costs of each group in the following 
section.   
Merged/non-merged hospitals  
For both merged and non-merged hospitals, the association between the number 
of acute beds, occupancy rate, time and hospital costs is significantly positive (P < 
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0.05). This suggests that the greater the number of beds and occupancy rate, the 
higher the hospital costs. Moreover, the positively significant association between 
time and hospital costs indicates that hospital costs increase as time goes by. While 
the number of competitors and hospital costs are negatively and significantly 
associated for merged hospitals, they are negatively and insignificantly associated for 
non-merged hospitals. This suggests that the more competitors the merged hospitals 
have, the lower their hospital costs will be.  
Public/private hospitals 
 Ownership may have impact on hospital costs due to the production technology 
the hospital adopts such as centralized management (Fournier and Mitchell, 1992). 
For private hospitals, the association between the number of acute beds, occupancy 
rate, the number of competitors and hospital costs is insignificant (P > 0.05). However, 
the association between time and hospital costs is positively significant (P < 0.05), 
suggesting that as time passes, the hospital costs of private hospitals increases. For 
public hospitals, the association between the number of acute beds, occupancy rate, 
time and hospital costs is positively significant. Nevertheless, the number of 
competitors and hospitals costs for public hospitals has a negatively insignificant 
association.  
Medical centers/regional hospitals/district hospitals 
 For medical centers, the association between the number of acute beds, time and 
hospital costs is positively significant (P < 0.05). However, occupancy rate, the 
number of competitors and hospital costs are positively insignificant (P > 0.05). For 
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regional hospitals, occupancy rate, time and hospital costs have significant and 
positive associations. Yet the association of occupancy rate, the number of 
competitors and hospital costs is insignificant. For district hospitals, the number of 
acute beds, time and hospital costs is significantly and positively associated, while 
occupancy rate, the number of competitors and hospital costs is insignificantly 
associated.  
Northern/Southern/Central Taiwan hospitals 
 For northern and southern Taiwan hospitals, the number of acute beds, 
occupancy rate, time and hospital costs have positive and significant associations (P < 
0.05). Therefore, the higher number of beds and occupancy rate, then the higher the 
costs. Moreover, costs increase with time. For both northern and southern Taiwan 
hospitals, although the association between the number of competitors and hospital 
costs is insignificant, the direction is opposite. For northern Taiwan hospitals, the 
association is negative, suggesting that the more the competitors, the lower the 
hospital costs. In contrast, for southern Taiwan hospitals, the association is 
insignificant yet positive, suggesting that the more the competitors, the higher the 
hospital costs. Finally, hospitals in central Taiwan demonstrate a significant 
association between the number of acute beds, time and hospital costs. However, the 
association between the number of acute beds and hospital costs is negatively 
significant, suggesting that the higher the number of acute beds, the lower the hospital 
costs.  




 The study examines the association between hospital costs and 
merged/non-merged hospitals, the number of competitors, hospital ownership, 
occupancy rate, location, the number of acute beds, and time. The results indicate that 
the number of acute beds, the occupancy rate of acute beds, and year are significantly 
associated with hospital costs.  
The number of acute beds, occupancy rate, and time (Table 5.6): The results are 
consistent with previous research that demonstrates larger scale hospitals such as 
medical centers and regional hospitals result in higher operating costs (Lin, 2015). 
The results also reflect the current situation in Taiwan where the delivery of medical 
services is concentrated in large hospitals and high bed occupancy rates occur mainly 
in these large hospitals (Cheng, Y.W., 2015; Okma and Crivelli, 2010; Wang and 
Cheng, 2005). However, whether or not larger hospitals incurring higher costs as 
found in this study is due to inefficiency would require further investigation based on 
more detailed data. Moreover, the association between year and hospital costs is 
significantly positive. This result also points out the continuously rising healthcare 
expenditures in Taiwan. In view of the growing aging population, and increasing 
medical needs, healthcare expenditures are expected to continue to grow (Lin, 2015; 
Hung and Chung, 2008). Thus identifying the drivers of the escalating costs is crucial 
in finding effective cost containment strategies.  
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In the subgroup analysis on the association of bed size, occupancy rate, time and 
hospital costs based on merged/non-merged, ownership, levels, and location, for 
merged and non-merged hospitals, their costs have significant and positive association 
with the number of acute beds, occupancy rate, and time. In terms of hospital 
ownership, the association is significantly positive only for public hospitals. The costs 
of private hospitals do not have significant association with bed size and occupancy 
rate. This may be due to the fact that private hospitals do not receive the same public 
subsidies that public hospitals do. Thus private hospitals, regardless of their size or 
occupancy rate, would practice in accordance with their hospitals’ financial benefits to 
reduce their costs and increase profitability by whatever means (Lin et al., 2003; 
Chang et al., 2004). However, private hospitals incur higher costs than public 
hospitals. This may be due to the flexibility of private hospitals to acquire new 
technology. They do not need to go through the Government Budget Act that public 
hospitals are required to do, and thus they can increase their spending in new 
technology (Hung and Chang, 2008). In terms of hospital level, the results are mixed 
which is parallel to the inconsistent consensus on the association of hospital costs 
with hospital level and size (Chiang et al., 2014). For instance, for medical centers, 
regional hospitals and district hospitals, hospital costs are positively and significantly 
associated with time. However, only for medical centers and district hospitals, are 
hospital costs significantly and positively associated with the number of acute beds. 
For regional hospitals, costs have positive and significant association with occupancy 
rate and time but not with bed size. In terms of location, for hospitals in northern 
Taiwan, and southern Taiwan, the association of hospital costs with bed size and time 
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is significantly positive, while the association is significantly negative for those in 
central Taiwan. This may suggest that larger central Taiwan hospitals have achieved 
economies of scale, and they are more efficient in controlling their costs than 
hospitals in the other two locations. 
Hospital ownership (Table 5.6): The association found in this study is insignificant 
(P > 0.05). Also, the results found in this study in regard to the association between 
hospital ownership and hospital costs are inconsistent with previous research that 
demonstrates public hospitals incur larger costs than private hospitals (Lin et al., 2003; 
Fournier and Mitchell, 1992). However, most of the previous literature that examines 
such associations is based on treatments for certain categories of diseases and thus 
only represents specific costs. Indeed, private hospitals own 70% of the hospital beds 
in Taiwan (Okma and Crivelli, 2010). That private hospitals have higher costs may be 
explained by their spending more on procurement and upgrading of medical 
equipment and technology than public hospitals (Hung and Chang, 2008).  
Merged/non-merged hospitals, number of competitors (Table 5.6): The 
associations between merged/non-merged hospitals, the number of competitors and 
hospital costs are insignificant. The coefficient for the number of competitors is 0, 
suggesting that the number of competitors does not have an impact on hospital costs. 
Merged hospitals depict insignificantly lower costs than non-merged hospitals. This is 
consistent with literature (Alexander et al., 1996; Connor et al., 1997; Dranove, 2003; 
Harrison, 2011; Spang et al., 2001; Vogt & Town, 2008;).  
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Hospital location (Table 5.6): The association between hospital costs and location is 
insignificant. This is inconsistent with the literature (Cutler, 2013; Sinay, 1998). 
However, comparing the costs of hospitals in the three different locations, the results 
show that hospitals in northern Taiwan have the highest costs. This is supported by 
existing research that finds that hospitals in northern Taiwan have a longer length of 
stay due to the higher density of hospitals in northern Taiwan and because of fierce 
competition, so they need to provide more care to maintain their patient volume (Lin 
et al., 2003). Thus they incur higher costs. However, promoting patient satisfaction 
may conflict with improving patient health outcomes and may result in increased 
hospital costs (Nuckols et al., 2013). Further research that includes average length of 
stay into the investigation on the association between hospital costs and hospital 
factors is therefore important. 
While cost containment is important, sustaining good quality of care is also 
crucial. Researchers stipulate that hospitals can maintain low costs or efficiency while 
delivering high quality of care (Larsson, S., 2013; Porter, M. and Teisberg, E., 2004). 
Furthermore, discharging patients earlier does not have a long-term detrimental 
impact on inpatient quality of care (Chen et al., 2010; Chang et al.; 2011). However, 
in general, concentrating on cost reduction often leads to deterioration in quality of 
care (Ward, 2016). In Taiwan, the current practice seems to emphasize cost 
containment more than improving quality of care (Chang, 2011). As policy makers 
implement policies limiting costs generated by healthcare providers to contain 
healthcare expenditures, engaging patients to improve outcomes and reduce waste of 
medical resources is equally crucial in containing the rising costs efficiently. While 
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healthcare providers should be accountable for providing good quality of care and 
minimize medical waste, both providers and patients should practice cost containment 
in order to ensure the long-term sustainability of the program. For example, the 
consensus that a shorter length of stay may mean worse quality of care needs to be 
changed as decreasing the length of stay for certain conditions can prove to decrease 
hospital costs without jeopardizing quality of care (Katz, 2010).  
This research has several limitations. The research may also be limited by its 
small sample size, which is likely to cause the power of econometric tests to be 
decreased (Spang et al., 2009). As Spang et al. (2009) point out: a small number of 
observations decreases the power of econometric tests and restricts the researcher’s 
ability to test the significance of effects of the association being studied. Moreover, 
the non-random selection of the case can lead to selection bias. The inclusion of a 
greater number of hospitals to increase the sample size would help minimize the 
problems on generalizability and the power of econometric tests. Due to the limited 
access to certain hospital data such as average length of stay, the number of 
employees, the number of registered nurses, case-mixed index, or severity of illness 
of patients treated in each hospital and patient level data, the scope of the findings in 
this study is limited. Furthermore, the study relied on the process measures compiled 
by MOHW that can help the public evaluate hospital quality of care. While such data 
allows the study to examine associations, it does not provide information on causality.   




The study finds that the number of acute beds, the occupancy rate, and time have 
an impact on hospital costs. This is consistent with the prediction of the study. In 
particular, for merged and non-merged hospitals, public hospitals, and hospitals in 
northern and southern Taiwan, the number of acute beds, the occupancy rate, and time 
have an impact on their costs. Findings in this study may suggest that hospital costs 
could be influenced by public policies and practices. This study may serve as a 
foundation for further investigation based on a larger sample of hospitals and longer 
period of time. This would support the assessment of whether the factors identified in 
this study provide consistent results and would provide a better understanding of the 




Table 5.1 Summary statistics of costs from 2012 to 2014 for all hospitals   
Statistics§ 2012 2013 2014 
Mean (S.E.) 151,858 (19,120) 155,730 (19,390) 159,973 (20,601) 
Std. Deviation 154,158 158,722 160,904 
Minimum  21,364   22,568  24,919 
Maximum 620,845 661,362 686,417 
Median  73,302  74,386  77,631 










Table 5.2 Summary statistics for merged/non-merged hospitals   
Statistics§ 2012 2013 2014 
Merged hospitals    
Mean (S.E.) 172,598 (132,542) 173,415 (130,895)  178,689 (133,514)  
Std. Deviation 229,570 226,716  231,254  
Minimum  39,506   41,854  44,748 
Maximum 437,582 435,203  445,719  
Median  40,403  43,186   45,601  
 
Non-merged hospitals 
Mean (S.E.) 150,860 (19,337) 154,901 (19,663) 159,005 (20,909) 
Std. Deviation 152,261 157,304 159,239 
Minimum  21,364  22,568  24,919 
Maximum 620,846 661,362 686,417 
Median  73,480  75,103  78,986 






Table 5.3 Summary statistics for public/private hospitals   
Statistics§ 2012 2013 2014 
Private hospitals    
Mean (S.E.) 157,377 (22,679) 162,772 (23,365)  159,048 (23,630)  
Std. Deviation 141,633 147,777  141,785  
Minimum  22,357   22,568  24,919 
Maximum 496,383  515,711  556,914  
Median  95,057  97,946  100,817  
 
Public hospitals 
Mean (S.E.) 143,580 (34,096) 145,297 (33,886) 161,305 (37,632) 
Std. Deviation 173,860 176,078 188,162 
Minimum  21,364  25,906  29,854 
Maximum 620,846 661,362 686,417 
Median  59,290  64,357  66,426 










Table 5.4 Summary statistics for medical center/regional/district hospitals   
Statistics§ 2012 2013 2014 
Medical Centers    
Mean (S.E.) 321,205 (40,799) 334,421 (42,369)  349,714 (44,842)  
Std. Deviation 158,014 164,094  173,674  
Minimum 138,322  142,443 109,020 
Maximum 620,846  661,362  686,417  
Median 297,528 306,649  318,498  
 
Regional Hospitals 
Mean (S.E.) 109,318 (18,180) 111,837 (18,047) 89,362 (11,999) 
Std. Deviation 113,534 115,561 72,990 
Minimum  30,787  25,745 28,293 
Maximum 448,727 471,073 447,484 
Median  67,760  68,515  68,304 
    
District Hospitals    
Mean (S.E.)  71,755 (31,654)  75,661 (33,450) 134,025 (53,847) 
Std. Deviation 104,985 110,941 161,543 
Minimum  21,364  22,568  24,919 
Maximum 359,590 381,152 404,684 
Median  28,543  28,235  42,617 





Table 5.5 Summary statistics for northern/southern/central Taiwan hospitals   
Statistics§ 2012 2013 2014 
Northern    
Mean (S.E.) 185,986 (35,235) 193,369 (36,229)  203,224 (40,266)  
Std. Deviation 179,665 184,733  193,110  
Minimum  24,908   25,906  42,167 
Maximum 620,845  661,362  686,417  
Median 138,660 143,992  155,489  
 
Southern 
Mean (S.E.) 126,796 (26,231) 128,497 (26,634) 137,741 (28,104) 
Std. Deviation 123,036 127,733 131,820 
Minimum  21,364  22,568  28,293 
Maximum 339,762 354,655 445,719 
Median  62,654  66,028  67,649 
    
Central    
Mean (S.E.) 132,096 (35,630) 136,161 (35,691) 128,369 (35,249) 
Std. Deviation 146,907 151,426 140,998 
Minimum  22,419  23,163  24,919 
Maximum 359,590 471,072 404,685 





Table 5.6 Association between hospital competition, the number of acute beds, 
occupancy rate, ownership, merger, location, time and hospital costs 
 
Hospital factors F Statistics P Post Hoc Analysis 
Number of competitors 0.002 0.966   
Number of acute beds 11.598 0.001  
Occupancy rate of acute beds  16.526 0.000  
Ownership‡  2.207 0.139 Private > Public 
Merger§ 0.029 0.866 Non-merged > Merged 
Location* 1.072 0.345 Northern > Central  
Time 263.253 0.000   
‡ includes both public and private hospitals 
§ includes both merged and non-merged hospitals 





Table 5.7 Subgroup analysis on association between bed size, occupancy rate, 
competition, time and hospital costs: based on merged/non-merged, ownership, 
levels, and locations 




Merger     
Merged hospitals     
Bed size§ 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 
Occupancy rate 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.002 
No of competitors -0.059 0.000 -0.073 -0.044 
Time 0.063 0.000 0.058 0.069 
     
Non-merged hospitals     
Bed size§ 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 
Occupancy rate 0.007 0.000 0.004 0.011 
No of competitors -0.03 0.085 -0.064 0.004 
Time 0.049 0.000 0.036 0.062 
     
Ownership    
Private hospitals     
Bed size§ -0.000 0.386 0.000 0.000 
Occupancy rate 0.001 0.170 -0.001 0.004 
No of competitors 0.001 0.897 -0.017 0.019 
Time 0.047 0.000 0.039 0.054 
     
Public hospitals     
Bed size§ 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 
Occupancy rate 0.007 0.000 0.004 0.011 
No of competitors -0.030 0.085 -0.064 0.004 
Time 0.049 0.000 0.036 0.062 
     
Levels 
Medical centers     
Bed size§ 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
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Occupancy rate 0.002 0.205 -0.001 0.005 
No of competitors 0.011 0.397 -0.015 0.036 
Time 0.046 0.000 0.035 0.056 
     
Regional hospitals     
Bed size§ 0.000 0.678 0.000 0.000 
Occupancy rate 0.004 0.000 0.002 0.007 
No of competitors -0.003 0.802 -0.026 0.020 
Time 0.047 0.000 0.039 0.056 
     
District hospitals     
Bed size§ 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.003 
Occupancy rate 0.001 0.503 -0.002 0.003 
No of competitors -0.001 0.937 -0.020 0.019 
Time 0.061 0.000 0.054 0.067 
     
Location 
Northern      
Bed size§ 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 
Occupancy rate 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.006 
No of competitors -0.022 0.087 -0.047 0.003 
Time 0.057 0.000 0.048 0.066 
     
Southern      
Bed size§ 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002 
Occupancy rate 0.007 0.005 0.002 0.012 
No of competitors 0.006 0.697 -0.023 0.034 
Time 0.046 0.000 0.028 0.065 
     
Central      
Bed size§ -0.001 0.027 -0.001 -0.0000 
Occupancy rate 0.004 0.236 -0.003 0.010 
No of competitors -0.044 0.202 -0.112 0.024 
Time 0.042 0.000 0.022 0.063 
§ = the number of acute beds 







Figure 5.1 Comparisons of total operating costs from 2012 to 2014 between each 





Figure 5.2 Comparisons of total operating costs from 2012 to 2014 between each 





Figure 5.3 Comparisons of total operating costs from 2012 to 2014 among each 
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Figure 5.4 Comparisons of total operating costs from 2012 to 2014 among each 
group of hospitals: northern Taiwan hospitals vs. southern Taiwan hospitals vs. 










CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION 
Overview 
The main goal of this research is to add to the limited existing research in Taiwan 
regarding the effects of hospital factors on hospital costs and quality of care. This 
research contains three studies with the following objectives: (1) Integrates the results 
of 11 previous independent studies on the effect of hospital competition on quality of 
care to derive conclusions about the association; (2) Identify the factors such as 
hospital merger, competition, ownership, level, location, the number of acute beds are 
associated with quality of care; and (3) Investigate if the factors such as hospital 
ownership, competition, merged/non-merged, location, the number of acute beds, the 
occupancy rate, time are associated with hospital costs. Most of the findings in this 
research are consistent with those of previous research. This chapter provides a 
summary of the main findings of this research, its limitations, policy implications, and 
recommendations for future research.    
 
Main Findings  
Chapter 3 is a systematic review and meta-analysis of previous research about 
the effect of hospital competition on quality of care. Eleven studies are included in the 
analysis. All studies use 28 or 30-day AMI mortality rates as one quality measure and 
some studies include more quality measures. For instance, there is one study that uses 
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36 measures, one that applies 18 indicators, and one that employs 4 different mortality 
rates. In terms of competition measures, all studies mainly use HHI and/or the number 
of competitors in the marketplace but three studies use both and one study applies 
twelve different measures. Based on the qualitative review, among the eleven studies 
selected, four studies demonstrate that hospital competition significantly reduces AMI 
rates (better quality) while four studies show increased AMI rates (worse quality). The 
remaining three depict insignificant decreased quality. However, the results of the 
meta-analysis depict that the pooled effect of hospital competition is reduced quality, 
although the overall effect is statistically insignificant. Moreover, the results of 
meta-regression demonstrate that the year of publication is a crucial source of 
heterogeneity. Cumulative study indicates that the magnitude of the impact of hospital 
competition on mortality rates reduces over time. The implications from both results 
are that the continuous policy attention on improving quality of care as well as 
improvement in medical technology and practices may have helped reduce AMI 
mortality rates.  
 The results from the above study lead to the examination of other potential 
factors which may also influence quality of care. Thus, in Chapter 4, the association 
of hospital merger, ownership, hospital levels, location and quality of care are 
investigated. The study finds that hospital levels, ownership, and location are 
significantly associated with quality of care. However, hospital mergers are found to 
have an insignificantly mixed association with quality of care. Generally speaking, the 
study finds that medical centers and regional hospitals have poorer quality than 
district hospitals. This may be partly due to the overcrowding of patients with mild 
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illnesses in these hospitals which affects the delivery of care provided to patients with 
more severe and complex conditions.  
Moreover, all levels of hospitals are significantly associated with poor quality in 
term of Revisit. This is evidenced in the 2014 Population Healthcare Quality Indicator 
by MOHW, which shows ratings being poorer than those of OECD countries in the 
quality aspect in terms of whether doctors’ are communicating with patients 
efficiently and sufficiently. Moreover, such short visits could also contribute to the 
continuously rising medical costs as patients tend to go for second or third visits (Wu 
et al., 2010). In fact, the average number of outpatient visits in Taiwan continues to 
rise since the inception of NHI and has reached to 15.12 visits in 2012 (Department of 
Health, 2016). Compared to other developed countries in the world, Taiwan’s average 
number of outpatient visits has been one of the highest in the world (Chan, 2010). 
Indeed, in 2012, Taiwan has the highest average number of outpatient visits in the 
world (Mossialos and Wenzl, 2015). Thus, implementing strategies such as the 
practice of the gatekeeper system or changing hospital level to only medical centers 
and general hospitals so that large hospitals can focus more on medical research and 
caring for patients with more severe and complex diseases may help improve such 
situation (Lin, 2005). Policy attention to enhance the quality of care of public 
hospitals and to eliminate the overcrowding problem in large hospitals is important in 
improving quality of care in Taiwan.  
Having examined the quality aspect, this study turns to the investigation of other 
aspects of hospital performance, such as costs. The study uses hospital factors such as 
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the number of acute beds, the occupancy rate of the acute beds, the number of 
competitors, merged/non-merged hospital, hospital ownership, location, and time to 
examine the contributing factors that influence hospital operating costs. The study 
finds that the number of acute beds, the occupancy rate, and year are significantly and 
positively associated with hospital costs. These results are consistent with the study’s 
predication. Moreover, these results are also in accordance with the present situation 
in Taiwan where the delivery of medical services is concentrated in large hospitals 
and the healthcare expenditures are continuing to rise in Taiwan (Hung and Chang, 
2008; Lin, 2005). In contrast, the number of competitors, hospital ownership, 
merged/non-merged, and location are found to be insignificantly associated with 
hospital costs. However, such results may be due to the small sample size of this study 
and thus further investigation based on a larger sample of hospitals and longer period 
of time can help substantiate the findings.  
In view of the growing aging population and healthcare expenditures, it is crucial 
for policy makers to understand the factors influencing the costs and to formulate 
strategies that can contain costs while sustaining good quality of care. Furthermore, 
while it is useful to have quality benchmarks, it is also crucial to ensure that hospitals 
have incentives to maintain good quality of care as well as containing their costs. 
Linking quality performance with reimbursements may be an effective practice 
(Chang, 2011; Rosenthal et al., 2005; Ward, 2016). The following table summarizes 
the findings from Chapter 4 and 5. 
 



















Merged   √  √ 
Non-merged   √ √  
      
Private  √  √  
Public √    √ 
      
Medical CTR √   √  
Regional √   √  
District  √   √ 
      
Northern √   √  
Central   √ √  




 There are several limitations that need to be addressed when interpreting the 
findings of the research. First, due to the limited access to hospital level data such as 
averaged length of stay, case mixed index, the number of discharges, and patient level 
data, these potential influencers are not included and examined in this research. The 
scope of the findings from this study is thus limited. The study attempted to address 
this limitation by including variables such as occupancy rate, hospital levels, and the 
number of competitors. The purpose was to find out whether these variables do have 
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an impact on hospital quality or costs. Second, the study is limited by the time period 
of data due to the unavailability of longer-term data. Third, the research may also be 
limited by its small sample size, and thus the test of the significance of the effects of 
the factors on quality or hospital costs may be restricted. Therefore, when data is 
made available, the author intends to include a larger hospital sample size, patient 
level data, and hospital level data with a longer period of time to conduct further 
analysis. This will help substantiate the findings of this study, and provide a better 
understanding on the potential factors that may influence hospital quality of care or 
costs. This will strengthen the representation of the findings and provide greater value 
to their pertinence. Moreover, the non-random selection of the case can lead to 
selection bias. Inclusion of all hospitals or randomly select the hospitals can help 
overcome this issue for future study. Furthermore, in Chapter 3, to avoid publication 
bias, unpublished studies were included. As there seems to be limited current and 
detailed research on the pooled effects of hospital competition associated with quality 
of care, the effects of hospital factors associated with quality of care, and the effects 
of hospital factors associated with hospital operating costs, this study will serve as a 
foundation for further research on these topics. 
 
Policy Implications 
 There are significant implications on quality of care and hospital costs from the 
findings of this research. For instance, one of the findings from this study indicates a 
significant association between all hospitals and quality in terms of Revisit. Under the 
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existing reimbursement policy, reimbursements to physicians will be reduced in 
accordance with the number of outpatients exceeding the certain thresholds set by the 
NHI (Lee, 2001). However, physicians are not likely to restrict the number of 
outpatients even if their reimbursements are reduced based on the scaling number of 
patients they see (Chu, 2001). As such, each patient may receive less than 5 minutes 
of consultation on a visit, and thus patients are likely to go for a second or third visit 
(Wu et al., 2010). While patient volume increases, medical costs also rise as a result 
(Ibid). However, hospital revenues increase in accordance with patient volume (Ward, 
2016). Thus it seems reasonable for BNHI to implement such a policy to reimburse 
providers on a scaling basis. Taiwan has a ratio of 6 to 4, which indicates that the 
BNHI spends about 69% of total health expenditures on outpatient services and 31% 
on inpatient services in comparison to the ratio of health expenditures on outpatient 
and inpatient services, for OECD countries, which is 4 to 6 (Chu, 2001). This may 
suggest that the number of outpatient services is too high and the focus on the 
treatment of severe diseases and inpatient services has been overlooked in Taiwan 
(Ibid). Although it may seem reasonable to shift the focus of hospital services from 
outpatient to inpatient and to control the high costs of NHI, this practice may 
inevitably affect the quality of care of hospitals.  
In Taiwan, hospitals must be accredited by the Taiwan Joint Commission on 
Hospital Accreditation (TJCHA) which classifies hospitals into three levels based on 
the accreditation results: medical centers, regional and district hospitals (Chang et al., 
2011). Hospitals are reimbursed in accordance with their levels (Lee, 2014). Hospitals 
of the same level receive the same reimbursement schedule; however, for the same 
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type of care provided (i.e. based on the disease codes assigned by the BNHI), medical 
centers receive the highest reimbursement, followed by regional and district hospitals 
(Chang et al., 2011). Moreover, as hospitals are reimbursed a fixed amount, then they 
(especially private hospitals) would seek any possible way to increase their revenues 
(Lin et al., 2003). Furthermore, as an unintended consequence of the accreditation, 
resources are allocated mainly to large-scale and urban hospitals (Lee, 2014). Indeed, 
the process of accreditation has been criticized for being burdensome to healthcare 
providers (Liu, 2015). Also, the information provided by hospitals has been identified 
as being fraudulent as some of the requirements and standards are unachievable, 
therefore some hospitals forge the data (Chen, 2016). As such, government 
organizations shall develop and unify quality measures or metrics that are manageable 
for healthcare providers, and can provide reliable results that can link healthcare 
reimbursements with quality of care. This would help contain hospital costs while 
ensuring good quality of care. For instance, a total patient harm rate that contains 
various harm measures such as adverse drug event, hospital acquired infection rate, 
fall rate, and pressure ulcers can reflect the levels of efficiency of a hospital (Ward, 
2016). The hospitals can then be reimbursed based on their levels of efficiency.    
It is a challenge to maintain good quality of care while containing costs (Chang, 
2011). In view of the growing aging population and increasing medical needs, 
healthcare expenditures are expected to continue to grow (Lin, 2015; Hung and 
Chung, 2008). While cost containment is important, sustaining good quality of care is 
also crucial. However, the current practice seems to emphasize cost containment more 
than improving quality of care (Chang, 2011). Policy makers shall identify and unify 
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quality measures that can link performance with reimbursements (Chang, 2011; 
Rosenthal et al., 2005; Ward, 2016). As such, costs can be contained without creating 
deleterious quality of care. In addition, this research finds that competition does not 
show statistical significant impact on hospital costs and quality. However, this may be 
due the small sample size of the study. As healthy competition can induce continuous 
improvements in technology, medical practices, and methods, hospital costs can be 
reduced and quality can be enhanced consequently (Porter and Teisberg, 2004). Policy 
makers ought to seek ways to encourage healthy competition among healthcare 
providers by making hospital data transparent so that they can compare and learn 
from the best performers.   
  
Future Research 
Due to the current limited research on the associations of hospital competition, 
hospital factors with quality of care and hospital costs in Taiwan, further research on 
such associations is suggested. For meta-analysis on quality of care, the inclusion of 
more studies when they are available will help substantiate the findings from this 
study. For future research on the association of potential factors that may influence 
quality of care, employing a larger sample of hospitals, a longer period of time, and 
other quality measures will be helpful in assessing if the results from this study are 
consistent in other settings. Similarly, for future research on hospital costs, the 
inclusion of a larger sample of hospitals, a longer period of time, and other factors 
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such as average length of stay, case-mix index, hospital discharges, and patient level 
data could add greater validation to the study’s robustness.  
Conclusion 
In view of the growing healthcare expenditures and the aging population in 
Taiwan, it is crucial to discover the factors that impact hospital costs and quality of 
care in order to ensure the continuity of the National Health Insurance program and to 
sustain good quality of care. The study identifies the potential factors that may 
contribute to the quality of care and hospital costs, although other factors may also be 
of influence quality of care and hospital costs. Nevertheless, this study provides a 
foundation for further investigation and analyses on these associations. The factors 
identified are not causes of the rising costs and deteriorating quality of care, yet they 
lead to the fundamental problems pertaining to the costs and quality of care in Taiwan. 
They are detrimental through this association. However, before policies can be 
implanted effectively and successfully, certain aspects must be considered. The most 
important aspect would be the organizational culture of a hospital. Only a hospital 
with a culture that advocates increasing efficiencies and eliminating medical waste 
and errors can ensure policies aimed at reducing medical waste and improving quality 
of care can be implemented effectively. However, reinforcing such culture may be the 
most difficult part to achieve as it is a long-term process. Regardless, it is only 
through the building of such culture that quality can be improved and costs can be 
contained ultimately. When hospitals all reinforce such culture, policy attention 
focusing on reducing medical waste and ensuring good health outcomes can be 
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effectively implemented. Furthermore, policy makers shall identify the quality 
measures that matter to patients, enforce all hospitals to use them, ensure the 
transparency of such quality data, and encourage all hospitals to compare and learn 
from each other. Most importantly, they need to link performance with 
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